Decentralisation and corruption: evidence across countries

Auteur(s) : Fishman, R.; Gatti, G.W.

Organisation : World Bank

Editeur : Washington, World Bank, 2000

Pages :

24 p.

Collection : Policy research working paper, 2290

The relationship between decentralization of government activities and the extent of rent extraction by private parties is an important element in the recent debate on institutional design. The theoretical literature makes ambiguous predictions about this relationship, and it has remained virtually unexamined by empiricists. Fishman and Gatti make a first attempt at examining the issue empirically, by looking at the cross-country relationship between fiscal decentralization and corruption as measured by a number of different indices. Their estimates suggest that fiscal decentralization in government spending is significantly associated with lower corruption. The evidence also suggests a number of areas for future work, including investigating whether there are specific services for which decentralized provision has a particularly strong impact on political rent extraction, and understanding the channels through which decentralization succeeds in keeping corruption in check.

  • Secteur des entreprises, Corruption, Développement économique et social, Gestion de l'éducation, Administration centrale, Décentralisation, Finances
  • International