


Building Public Support for Anti-Corruption Efforts

WHY ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCIES NEED TO COMMUNICATE AND HOW



By Elaine Byrne, Anne-Katrin Arnold and Fumiko Nagano

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Communication for Governance & Accountability Program (CommGAP)
External Affairs
1818 H Street NW, MSN U11-1102
Washington DC 20433
Telephone: 202-458-7955
Fax: 202-522-2654
Website: [http:// www.worldbank.org/commgap](http://www.worldbank.org/commgap)
Blog: <http://blogs.worldbank.org/publicsphere>
E-mail: commgap@worldbank.org

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Acronyms

CPIB	Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau [Singapore]	HRDC	Human Resources Development Canada
CPI	Corruption Perception Index	KACC	Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	PEA	political-economy analysis
EFCC	Economic and Financial Crimes Commission [Nigeria]	SMS	Short Message Service
GDP	Gross Domestic Product	TAG	Transparent Accountable Governance
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome	TI	Transparency International

All amounts are presented in U.S. dollars, unless otherwise indicated.

Preface

Are we losing the fight against corruption? Not necessarily, and certainly not for lack of effort or effectiveness. However, we notice cases where the more successful an anti-corruption body is, the more likely it is to fail. At first blush, that correlation seems illogical; but successes encourage counterattacks by powerful and well-funded individuals or groups. In addition, the media hold anti-corruption agencies to standards of success that often are impossible to achieve. Success in a series of small cases will be met by accusations that “you let the big fish get away.” Civil society organizations always seem dissatisfied and always want you to do more, even if one could argue that this is what those organizations are supposed to do!

Fighting corruption is not easy. Unlike many criminals, dishonest public officials often continue to have power and influence. Political interference, even in cases involving low-level officials, frequently can derail a prosecution. Civil society organizations may help uncover fraudulent activities, but they also may undermine effective prosecution by inadvertently tampering with evidence or tipping off the crooked politicians. Worse, they can go “public” with exaggerated claims that make the final conviction and restitution look comparatively puny and suspicious. The media may release stories prematurely, allowing corrupt parties to hide or destroy evidence and move illicit proceeds to safe havens, often in other parts of the world.

Months of work can be wasted because other parties have undermined an agency’s efforts. Developing evidence in corruption cases is not easy, especially because most corruption is “consensual”—that is, both sides benefit from the exchange.

Unfortunately, this explains why many people in anti-corruption agencies do not see civil society and the media as friends. This perceived adversarial relationship leads to a spiral of distrust and suspicion on

all sides. As a result, anti-corruption efforts become less effective, and the agencies are thrown into an increasingly negative light.

There is a global recognition that something must be done about corruption—but far less agreement about how to correct the situation most effectively. Although there was early acknowledgment that independent anti-corruption agencies might hold the key, many in the international community now are questioning such agencies’ value because of the high-profile destruction of successful agencies in both developing and developed countries.

What is to be done? Primarily, leaders in anti-corruption bodies must understand that success always occurs on two fronts: getting the “bad guys” and being able to explain why the agency’s work is both effective and important. With its emphasis on establishing effective media strategies and taking proactive measures to get the anti-corruption message to the public, this practical guide is designed to help leaders in anti-corruption agencies position themselves well on the second of those fronts.

The paper is purposely short. It is intended as a “how-to guide” to help agencies understand how to control the way they present themselves to the public, how to frame their agencies’ work, and how to develop allies in the press and the community at large.

No one reading this needs to be lectured on the importance of controlling corruption and countering its devastating impact on individuals, communities, and nations. Because of the United Nations Convention against Corruption, everyone in the global community has an opportunity to change the reality of corruption. But it is those anti-corruption professionals, frequently little appreciated and too often demeaned, who can have real impact. It is their efforts that will win or lose the battle. And I commend and celebrate them with these words from someone who was noted for giving a good fight:

It is not the critic who counts: not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles or where the doer of deeds could have done better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, who strives valiantly, who errs and comes up short again and again, because there is no effort without error or shortcoming, but who knows the great enthusiasms, the great devotions, who spends himself for a worthy cause; who, at the best, knows, in the end, the triumph of high achievement, and who, at the worst, if he fails, at least he fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who knew neither victory nor defeat. (Theodore Roosevelt, "Citizenship in a Republic" speech, April 23, 1910)

My hope is that this practical guide will be useful. In the international community, we need to find more and better ways to support those people who work in the field of anti-corruption. We need to use more realistic standards for measuring their success and we must spend more time developing tools to make their very difficult jobs a bit easier. Having worked in the field of anti-corruption for more than a quarter of a century, I know how important the job is, and I recognize that the work of these professionals often can endanger their careers and their lives. For the commitment, integrity, and perseverance of people in the anti-corruption field, all of us should be grateful.

Dr. Stuart C. Gilman
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

Washington, DC
Fall 2009

Introduction

The rise of corruption as an issue on the international agenda is recent; and, in a relatively short period of time, it has achieved significant importance. Initially a marginalized element in international aid programs, corruption is now regarded as a dynamic feature on the development agenda. As a consequence, a heightened sense of accountability among politicians, public bodies, and institutions has emerged, as has a consequent demand for anti-corruption agencies.

These agencies are created with great optimism and fanfare. They often are the major initiative by a new party or government swept into office on a reform platform. In most cases, the initial publicity around these agencies and the officials appointed to run them is positive and supportive.

However, it seems to take little time for that “honeymoon period” to end. In South Africa, for example, the Directorate of Special Operations (an elite unit of investigators known as the Scorpions), established in 1999, officially was abolished by Parliament in 2009. The Scorpions were responsible for prosecutions against then-President of the African National Congress Jacob Zuma and his financial adviser Schabir Shaik. Jackie Selebi, the national police chief and an ally of former President Thabo Mbeki, also was arrested. The police force’s Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation, which has less statutory protection from political interference, has taken over the Scorpions’ mandate.

Anti-corruption agencies often are under extraordinary scrutiny from many different quarters. Their lack of quick action to address corruption is interpreted often as incompetence or political favoritism. The perceptions of the media and public can overwhelm an agency and force it into a defensive position. From there, it cannot actively honor its mandate and fight corruption; rather, it can only react.

Anti-corruption agencies face two closely interconnected forces: the media and the public, includ-

ing civil society organizations (see case study A). The media and the public pass judgment on the work of the agencies, and they play an active role in fighting corruption. The media largely determine where both forces stand: with or against the agency. If the forces stand against, an agency’s work may turn out to be simply futile. If the forces stand in favor, an agency is more likely to be successful. Furthermore, when the media supports the anti-corruption agency’s work, it is possible to turn the culture of an entire country toward openness and accountability.

Communication determines where the media stand in this struggle. And anti-corruption agencies themselves determine how much and how well they communicate with the media and with citizens. To their immense cost, many agencies underestimate the critical challenges and negative effects of weak and inadequate communication. This failure is one of the reasons why we are losing the fight against corruption.

When a media storm occurs, the absence of an agency’s response to the alleged corruption under investigation can facilitate an adverse perception in the public mind. Unchecked, such a perception may develop into assumptions about an agency’s legitimacy. In those circumstances, an agency can promote public trust in its operations by acting on an agreed media strategy. Providing basic information does not have to incorporate an acceptance or denial of the allegations. Instead, the public appetite can be satisfied with basic background information on why the allegation arose, what measures are in place, and what steps are to be taken.

This paper provides a practical overview of how an agency may work with the media to win the support of the public in the fight against corruption. The first part explains why anti-corruption agencies need to take the media particularly seriously, how the media communicate, and what effects they

Case Study A

Public Opinion and Corruption

The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria

When anti-corruption agencies work in isolation, without broader public support, they become vulnerable to unpredictable political will. If they are to take on the powerful interests in their societies, they cannot do it alone.

As Nuhu Ribadu, the former executive chairman of Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), testified before the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee in 2009, "When you fight corruption, it fights back. It will likely have greater resources than you and it is led by those who operate outside the law and view the fight as life and death for their survival."

Ribadu headed the government commission tasked with countering corruption and fraud. Appointed by President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2003, Ribadu was reappointed in 2007 and promoted to assistant inspector-general of police. In December 2007, the inspector-general of police announced that Ribadu temporarily would be removed as EFCC chair to accommodate a mandatory one-year training course.

During Ribadu's four-year tenure, Nigeria recovered more than \$5 billion in stolen assets. In his U.S. House committee testimony, Ribadu said that more than \$440 billion either has been stolen or has been wasted by Nigerian governments since independence in 1960. He estimated that this amount is six times the total of the Marshall Plan, the full sum needed to rebuild a devastated Europe in the aftermath of World War II.

Under Ribadu's administration, the EFCC charged prominent bankers, high-profile businessmen, former ministers, eight former state governors, senators, high-ranking political party members, and advance-fee conmen (known as "419ers"). Most prominent among the 275 convictions were those of banker Emmanuel Nwude and the former inspector-general of Nigeria's police service, Tafa Balogun, for allegedly stealing \$144 million.

Critics suggested that Ribadu was selective in whom he prosecuted, and that former President Obasanjo was using the agency to target his enemies. Ribadu may have been a victim of his own success. The agency became a political "football," and its legitimacy was undermined politically by accusations of favoritism.

The EFCC has been weakened in the period since Ribadu's removal. Its top investigators, trained by a variety of agencies in the United States, were transferred out of the EFCC. Hard-earned reform has been undone, and trust between different institutions has been weakened. As a consequence, Ribadu believes that "many of the law enforcement agencies that used to work hand in hand with the EFCC are no longer willing to partner with the EFCC or the Nigerian Justice Department."

Note

1. A billion is 1,000 millions.

Sources: Pomfret 2009; Nuhu Ribadu's testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services Committee, May 19, 2009, http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ribadu_testimony.pdf.

have on the public. Case studies illustrate all of these points—showing, for instance, how the media can distort the reality of corruption by following their own preformed perceptions of a corruption case. Government agencies can set things straight only

by providing sufficient and clear information, and by working closely with the media to ensure the message is accurate.

The second part of the paper focuses on the role of public opinion in the fight against corruption.

Public opinion can be a powerful tool in promoting an agency's work—or in bringing about its downfall. If citizens misunderstand the issue, they are unlikely to support the fight against corruption. But if public opinion is in favor of an anti-corruption agency, the people are able to change their country's culture.

The media can shape public opinion and, most of all, change norms about corruption. Here is an example: Communication campaigns can show that it not only is illegal to pay bribes to public officials, but also is immoral and does real harm to the community. This message can encourage the public to change the expectation of bribes and to resist demands for them—one more step in the fight against corruption. In India, for instance, anti-corruption efforts led to the printing of the “zero-rupee” note with a picture of Gandhi on its face. These notes were given to bribe seekers to shame them.

In the context of public opinion, it also is important that anti-corruption agencies understand the role of journalism and the conditions under which journalists work. Their reporting directly influences the perceptions and opinions of the public. Because of economic and other pressures, journalists often tend to simplify or dramatize stories—and that can produce the wrong perceptions among their audiences. Again, this paper provides real-world stories that show the impact of journalism on public opinion.

Anti-corruption agencies have another large problem to overcome: they must communicate and clarify the differences between types and degrees of corruption. Moral corruption is not necessarily legal corruption, and petty corruption is not the same as grand corruption. A common definition of corruption has been suggested by Transparency International (box 1). Another helpful source for understanding the actual meaning of corruption is the list of offenses presented by the United Nations Convention against Corruption (box 1). The third part of this paper addresses the difficulty of communicating these complex issues, including the specific case of asset recovery.

The citizenry as well as government officials may misjudge the success of an agency's work entirely if they measure it only through the simplified corruption indexes that some civil society organizations regularly publish. These indexes are perception based, and can over—or underreport

the actual level of corruption in a country. The fourth part of the paper addresses communication in this context. The media may overemphasize the

Box 1 Definition of Corruption and a List of Offenses

Transparency International's Definition

Transparency International (TI) has chosen a clear and focused definition of the term: Corruption is operationally defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain. TI further differentiates between “according to rule” corruption and “against the rule” corruption. Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law, constitute the former. The latter, on the other hand, is a bribe paid to obtain services the bribe receiver is prohibited from providing (http://www.transparency.org/news_room/faq/corruption_faq).

United Nations Convention against Corruption's List of Offenses

In Articles 15–28 of Chapter III, “Criminalization and Law Enforcement,” the United Nations Convention against Corruption details a list of offenses. The list includes the following acts:

- > bribery of national public officials
- > bribery of foreign public officials and officials of public international organizations
- > embezzlement, misappropriation, or other diversion of property by a public official
- > trading in influence
- > abuse of function
- > illicit enrichment
- > bribery in the private sector
- > embezzlement of property in the private sector
- > laundering of proceeds of crime
- > concealment
- > obstruction of justice
- > liability of legal persons
- > participation and attempt
- > knowledge, intent, and purpose as elements of an offense (http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/Publications/Convention/08-50026_E.pdf)

problem of corruption by honing in on a specific number from a corruption index. People reading or hearing that message may believe that corruption is a greater problem than it actually is and that the corruption-countering agencies are not doing their jobs. If people are helped to understand how various indexes are structured, they are more likely to apply them correctly. Clear and comprehensive information is needed to explain the role of such indexes to the media and their audiences.

The fifth part of this paper gives practical, hands-on advice for dealing with the media and for building corruption-fighting coalitions with the media and civil society. Anti-corruption agencies need to use very specific communication techniques such as framing—to make their messages interesting to and easily understood by the media and the public. There are particular problems that must be addressed and overcome when planning a communication campaign. For instance, the lack of freedom of information and speech can hinder any good work done by the media. Journalists need to be motivated to investigate corruption cases, so media bias has to be overcome. The paper concludes with pragmatic media actions that can be taken by anti-corruption agencies.

In addition to its discussion of the role of the media, this paper also provides several tools and checklists for agencies. These tools either have proved helpful to practitioners in other contexts or have been assembled directly by anti-corruption agency officials. The first toolkit comprises tools that list real-world challenges that anti-corruption agencies face in their daily work and activities designed to help meet those challenges. The second tool is a road map for designing a communication strategy with steps that easily can be followed to realize a desired outcome. The last tool sketches the phases of a coalition-building strategy, from building trust to achieving sustainable transformation.

Overall, this paper is designed to help anti-corruption agencies become more effective in fighting corruption. Communication is crucial for enlisting the media and civil society as partners in the fight. Agencies do not necessarily have to fear the media and civil society organizations. Instead, those groups can become strong supporters of anti-corruption efforts if agencies know how to work *with* them. This paper provides the guidance and tools to equip agencies to counter corruption with a new weapon: communication.

The Media as Communicators

The potential of the media as communication partners in promoting good governance is enormous. The *World Development Report 2002: Building Institutions for Markets* (World Bank 2001) acknowledges the role of the fourth estate in the democratization process:

The media can play an important role in development by affecting the incentives of market participants—businesses, individuals, or politicians—and by influencing the demand for institutional change. Information flows through the media can affect people’s ideas, monitor people’s actions, and thereby create constituencies for change and institutional reform.... And the media can empower people, including the poor, by giving them a platform for voicing diverse opinions, participating in governance, and engaging in markets. (pp. 192–93)

If the question is, Why should anti-corruption agencies cooperate with the media? the answer is simple: the media profoundly influence how people think about the world around them.¹

A country’s media may be considered a mirror that reflects the integrity of the government. The effectiveness of a country’s anti-corruption strategy increasingly depends on the media to communicate key messages to the public.

The Media’s Agenda vs. an Anti-corruption Agency’s Agenda

The ability to communicate a message to an audience is an exceptional power. Words not only inform, but also persuade, compel, and inspire. The media

can be partners with anti-corruption agencies in disseminating information on the legal mechanisms to combat corruption, instructing the public on how to report corruption, and raising public awareness of the complexities of different types of corruption (see case study B).

Personalities and images, rather than deeply entrenched political philosophy, have become the basis for political decision making. In this ideological vacuum, the media exert significant pressure on the policy agenda—pressure that is not always acknowledged candidly. Where communication is ambiguous, the media easily can manipulate the power of language to produce a good headline. For example, an incident involving four corrupt officials may be described as “Weak Anti-corruption Agency Finally Nets Four Low-Level Crooks.” Such value-laden depictions occur often at the expense of the integrity of the intended message.

Direct and Indirect Media Effects

The media have a dual role. First, they investigate and expose incidents of corruption. Second, they can prevent corruption in the first place by publicizing information about the nature, occurrence, and seriousness of corrupt behavior. This distinction between exposure and prevention of corruption is described as tangible or direct (exposure) and intangible or indirect (prevention) media effects (Stapenhurst 2000). These effects are important in fostering public accountability. (See case study C concerning *Bangladesh Sanglap*.)

Tangible outcomes are clearly visible and identifiable consequences of particular news stories. Here are some examples: the launching of investigations by parliamentary or other authorities into allegations of corruption; the censure, impeachment, or forced resignation of corrupt politicians; the firing of public

Case Study B

Media's Agenda vs. Anti-corruption Agency's Agenda

The Human Resources Development Scandal, Canada

Unless anti-corruption agencies work with the media, the media can work against anti-corruption agencies. In turn, excessive and outlandish reporting focusing on people-oriented rather than policy-oriented coverage can generate public cynicism (Cappella and Jamieson 1997). Such a context can pose serious challenges to an anti-corruption agency that must work within the constraints of often lengthy investigations that require due process and demand media coverage.

These issues were evident in the case of Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) in 2000. David Good was the assistant deputy minister of HRDC during a period when the department came under intense national public scrutiny. He subsequently chronicled his experiences in his book *The Politics of Public Management: The HRDC Audit of Grants and Contributions* (Good 2003). The HRDC scandal was the result of a series of factors that turned a correctable administrative matter into media headlines suggesting that the government had lost one billion dollars. The factors included the inability of the department to access the most basic information from its internal auditors for the purpose of responding to media queries, which weakened the department's ability to handle the crisis.

Moreover, staff members were exhausted and demoralized by the situation.

To complicate the matter, the media developed their own version of the story with their own preformed storylines. In addition to preformed storylines, the media simplified, dramatized, and personalized the story and cast unexpected events as part of the initial storyline so that first impressions became lasting impressions.

Anti-corruption agencies should beware of such methods that the media may employ. Errors by the media must be followed up and corrected *immediately* by the agency. The ability to respond quickly and accurately to media questions is particularly necessary in a crisis because it can prevent the audience from taking first impressions as facts. Public opinion is influenced quickly; once perceptions are formed it is hard to get the facts straight.

Everyone makes mistakes, including the media and anti-corruption agencies. What is important is the ability to acknowledge and accept that mistakes have been made. An adversarial relationship between the media and anti-corruption agencies can lead to mistakes being blown out of proportion—and that can destroy the fragile layer of public trust, on which the success of anti-corruption agencies depend.

officers; the start of judicial proceedings; the issuance of public recommendations by a watchdog body; and the scrapping of a law or policy that creates an environment conducive or even contributing to corruption.

Results of tangible or direct effects may include an increase in the cost of corrupt behavior among public officials. They also may boost the legitimacy of those people who are charged with checking such behavior and, in turn, may prompt public acceptance

of the role of whistleblowers in a society. Media reporting on corruption can curb corruption directly by eliciting preemptive responses from people keen to protect their reputations. It also may have long-term preventive effects by publicly identifying previously unknown vested interests or vulnerabilities within power structures.

Intangible outcomes are indirect and implicit within the context of the wider role that media play in society. For example, the role of the media as

Case Study C

Direct and Indirect Effects

Bangladesh Sanglap

BBC World Service Trust, BBC Bangla Service, and television stations in Bangladesh have worked in partnership since 2005 to produce a weekly political debate program called *Bangladesh Sanglap*. Filmed in front of a studio audience and with a weekly viewership of 7 million people, *Sanglap* has offered the first opportunity for voters to question and interact with politicians on television and radio. The groundbreaking program has facilitated a more accountable and responsive government by making it perfectly normal for ordinary citizens to ask questions of elected officials and for officials to explain their policies and decisions in an open forum. This program has succeeded in encouraging active citizen participation and mobilizing civil society.

At the beginning of the *Sanglap* initiative, the BBC World Service Trust conducted a “Pulse of Bangladesh” survey in 2005. When asked what the major problems facing Bangladesh were, 45 percent of respondents cited unemployment, and 37 percent pointed to transportation issues. It is significant that only 12 percent of respondents considered corruption important—a rate that

indicated Bangladeshi respondents did not identify unemployment and transportation issues as consequences of corruption.

A measure of *Sanglap's* success are indicators demonstrating that as the number of political discussion programs on air each week grew between July 2005 and July 2008, Bangladesh’s Transparency International Corruption Perception Index rating dropped by 32 ranks. A focus on systemic problems within public debate also helped establish in the public’s mind the link between corruption and individually perceived problems such as unemployment and poor transportation.

This media project illustrates the importance of integrating a media strategy into anti-corruption campaigns, and suggests the significant long-term advantages of building capacity among anti-corruption officials to work with the media. In particular, *Sanglap* has proved how a long-term media campaign can profoundly influence public opinion on the links between individual and systemic corruption and on its consequences. Its legacy has been to engage citizens in publicly demanding government accountability.

Sources: Anam 2002; BBC World Service Trust video, *About Bangladesh Sanglap*, http://www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/trust/whatwedo/where/asia/bangladesh/2008/04/080412_bangladesh_sanglap_video.shtml.

effective watchdogs on corruption is not always immediately obvious. However, the media can foster a democratic culture by exposing an administration’s activities, thereby raising public awareness about corrupt behavior and practices, and by educating

the public about the causes and consequences of corruption and its potential cures. By being a beacon of transparency, the media can generate public opposition to corruption.

Understanding Public Opinion

“Public opinion” refers to the opinion that seems to be the most dominant, widespread, or popular among a plurality of existing opinions. It is produced jointly by three main factors: elite opinion leaders, statistical records, and people’s perceptions. Elite opinion leaders express and publish opinions, have access to media outlets and technologies, and have high degrees of social influence or institutional power. Statistical records represent and measure opinions collected through polls and surveys. Finally, people’s perceptions of which opinions prevail in their social and media environments, and how their own opinions match those of others, also affect public opinion.

The people’s sense of what is the dominant opinion is influenced by the so-called spiral of silence. The essence of the spiral of silence is the assumption that people are afraid of being isolated, and so they adjust their opinions to what they perceive to be the opinion of the majority. Therefore, people will express their opinions confidently only when they believe that those opinions are shared by most other people in the relevant area; otherwise, they remain silent. If many people speak up against corruption, they will draw many more people to do likewise. The same effect is achieved when a small group of people speaks very loudly, and the majority is silent. If anti-corruption agencies manage to draw the media to their side, and the media speak up against corruption, people will perceive this stance to be a widely accepted position. As a result, they will speak against corruption themselves.

Consider this example: A local newspaper prints several reports and opinion pieces pointing to the successful work of the anti-corruption agency. If no other media outlet says very negative things about the agency, people will believe that it is commonly accepted that the agency does good work.

Another example that shows the importance of working with the media involves the issue of norms.

Petty corruption is furthered by people’s perception that it is absolutely normal to pay an official for some service that should be provided free of charge by the state. If people assume that everyone pays bribes and that most people just put up with the abuse, then petty corruption will become part of everyday life. The smaller the number of people who protest the practice, the smaller the number of people who will oppose it or voice their opinions against it. But if people rally together and speak up against corruption, they create a climate of opinion against it. And if they speak up loud enough, more and more people will join them because they won’t want to be isolated as outsiders who support bribery. Eventually, the climate of opinion will become the dominant stance—open opposition to corruption will become public opinion.

Only by mobilizing public opinion can anti-corruption agencies create the conditions necessary for systemic change. Defined as the rethinking and restructuring of systems in an interconnected way, systemic change involves four different stages: self-preservation, development of awareness, active reflection, and acceptance of risk.

In the first stage, focus is directed to maintaining the existing system. (See how the Transparency Accountability Coalition in the Philippines did this successfully, as described in case study D.) Those who are invested politically, economically, and socially in the status quo do not wish to recognize that structures are fundamentally out of sync with present realities. In the second stage, nonelite decision makers begin to develop an awareness that things as they stand simply are not working. In the absence of vision and direction, a period of reflection, reassessment, and exploration ensues in the third stage. Finally, to accomplish the transition to a new normal system, a critical number of opinion leaders openly must commit to change and must be prepared to confront and accept the risks of the unknown that this change entails.

Case Study D

Mobilizing Public Opinion

Transparency and Accountability Coalition in the Philippines

In the Philippines, the Transparent Accountable Governance (TAG) initiative is a good example of successful pro-reform coalition building. TAG effectively mobilized public opinion to create the conditions necessary for systemic change.

In the late-1990s, the Asia Foundation was able to build a coalition for curbing corruption. This coalition, in turn, fostered an improved environment for economic growth. Initially partnering with academic institutions to carry out research activities examining the problem of corruption in the Philippines, the coalition was joined over time by such other groups as the League of Cities of the Philippines, credible nongovernmental organizations, and private sector partners.

These additional coalition members increased the influence and ensured sustainable support for the initiative. In addition, the TAG Web site (<http://www.tag.org.ph>) proved instrumental in empow-

ering citizens and motivating them to participate by making their contributions visible in a publicly accessible space.

Unlike traditional one-way communication, which keeps repeating the same simple message through the same channel, coalition building involves building trust. This requires engaging people with credible messages, backed by research and evidence and delivered by credible messengers. Vested interests are at a disadvantage in this new landscape.

TAG has had significant achievements, such as textbook monitoring with the Department of Education, development of a feedback mechanism for procurement monitoring with the Office of the Ombudsman, and development of deployment software for civil society observers of the Bids and Awards Committee.

Source: de Quelen 2008.

Understanding Journalism

When it comes to public opinion, journalists are among the most influential groups. As we know it today, journalism is oriented largely toward the ideal of investigative reporting—both uncovering wrongdoing and creating scandals. Modern investigative journalism started with the Watergate scandal, involving U.S. President Richard Nixon and the Committee to Reelect the President. Nixon resigned from the White House as a result of press reports on his involvement in spying on his political adversaries. Watergate was the biggest story in American politics between 1972 and 1976. Journalists Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein of the *Washington Post* uncovered a system of political “dirty tricks” and crimes that eventually led to indictments of 40 White House and administration officials, and ultimately to the president’s resignation. Watergate made the public aware of political corruption and turned corruption into a mainstream media story.

Since the time of the Watergate scandal, the public has developed an appetite for corruption scandals. Investigative journalism now is regarded as profitable. Editors and newspaper owners encourage journalists to find their own Watergates. The discovery of a corruption scandal can solidify a newspaper’s place in history, boost the prestige of a crusading journalist, and dramatically increase commercial success.

The Watergate scandal demonstrates how the media are able to motivate public intolerance of behavior that generally has been ignored or perceived as acceptable and normal. By probing the public consciousness about the individual and societal consequences of corruption, the media contribute to eliciting stronger public demand for institutional change and for new moral standards in public life.

The Media Cycle and the “Feeding Frenzy”

In the modern media environment, the media are more vigorous, inquisitive, and commercial than ever before. They are more diverse and competitive; journalists do not always have time to check facts before publishing. The 24/7 news cycle makes analyses more shallow, information more simple, and complexities dispensable. Short sound bites are isolated and passed along out of context, increasing the likelihood of mistakes (however unintended). In the haste to meet deadlines, the media may sacrifice the finer points concerning corruption to the demands of generalization.

In addition, conflict between profit and journalism creates tension between the bottom line and journalistic integrity. A greater emphasis on revenue margins and bottom lines requires that media organizations emphasize those aspects of their operations that directly produce positive revenue results. Also, a smaller number of journalists are expected to use fewer resources and produce greater amounts of information for broadcast or print.

The orientation toward the preferences of advertisers has redefined the market and the audience, with a consequent emphasis on stories that are inexpensive and easy to cover and that focus on the individual (for example, pieces on celebrity lifestyles and high-profile court cases). Media also focus on sensational and personal accounts because it is easier to sell the game of politics than it is to convey the content of public issues. The substance is not as attractive to sell as is the sensational, the negative, and the scandalous.

In his seminal book, *Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics*, Larry J. Sabato (1991) defines a media feeding frenzy as

where “a critical mass of journalists leap to cover the same embarrassing or scandalous subject and pursue it intensely, often excessively, and sometimes uncontrollably” (p. 6). He believes that the media “prefers to employ titillation rather than scrutiny; as a result, its political coverage produces trivialization rather than enlightenment” (p. 6).

Media bias may be reflected in under- or over-reporting incidents of corruption. The quality of the news—including bias, inaccuracy, and deliberate sensationalism—is something that is not always obvious immediately. The newspaper reader or television viewer cannot tell if a report has been confirmed by multiple sources, cannot evaluate the reliability of unnamed sources, and cannot know what stories have not been reported.

An electorate’s perceptions can be irreversibly affected in the media’s attempts to feed the insatiable appetite for news. Reputation integrity that takes years to build can be lost in seconds. The public’s general perception of corruption may not match the actual occurrence of corruption.

Given that the media affect public opinion, anti-corruption agencies need to develop media relations strategies that take into account the extreme time constraints and pressures under which the media operate, and the incentives that media have in their

Figure A

Source: Joseph Farris, <http://www.cartoonstock.com>.

choice to cover certain types of news and ignore others. The media can play a key role in helping raise the public’s general awareness about corruption scandals and, more important, about corruption as a phenomenon.

The Trouble with Money: Asset Recovery and Communication

Some of the most difficult communication challenges for anti-corruption agencies involve recovering money or property from corrupt officials. Normally, one would expect such recovery to result in an avalanche of compliments from the public and the media. Without an active communication strategy, however, agencies find themselves on the defensive. Rather than kudos, they receive the most severe criticisms. Why does that happen?

One of the primary reasons for that outcome is that estimates of what has been stolen usually are exaggerated greatly when the case first becomes public. An arrest is made and a university professor or the head of a nonprofit organization is interviewed. He or she gives an “expert” opinion as to what the corrupt official either embezzled or received as bribes. The gap between that estimate and what the evidence actually supports is often quite large. So a front-page headline announcing that the former minister of finance took €100 million turns into a criticism of the anti-corruption agency because the agency has evidence to support only a €10 million claim. Without an effective communication strategy, such erroneous information can lead to accusations of conspiracy: the anti-corruption agency stole the rest for itself, the culpable individual is being protected, or forces outside of the country are hiding the balance of the money.

A secondary reason for criticizing the asset recovery work of an anti-corruption agency is that it is hardly ever able to recover the full amount. For example, tracking the €10 million corruption losses might result in finding only €5 million that can be frozen. Although most media and citizens expect the agency to recover the full amount, experience reveals that this happens quite rarely. There are various reasons why recovered funds seldom equal stolen funds. Perhaps the guilty individual used the

money to buy property that subsequently has lost value. And some monies are untraceable. The person may have invested in a scheme run by others who also were criminally corrupt and who either stole the money or went bankrupt. There are dozens of reasons why money is not recovered, but they all sound like excuses *after the fact*. Suddenly, expectations of €100 million have diminished to €5 million. It does not take a vivid imagination to suggest the resulting media stories.

Finally, agencies get into real difficulty because they fail to manage captured nonmonetary resources effectively. It is fine to release the fact that the agency has taken possession of a corrupt politician’s ranch, 1,000 head of cattle, and 200 hectares of wheat. But without effective management of that property and a well-conceived media strategy to document management successes, results can be disastrous. Flash forward two months, when the media publishes front-page headlines because the cattle have starved and the unharvested wheat has rotted in the field. Agencies often are not prepared to deal with nonmonetary property. Perhaps the most famous case involved the U.S. Department of Justice. After freezing the assets of the Mustang Ranch in Nevada in 1999 because of a criminal probe, the department discovered it was running the ranch’s business—that of a brothel!

A well-conceived media strategy can help agencies deal with all of those issues. By deciding ahead of time which person in the agency will be responsible for briefing the public and how that person should approach the issue of asset recovery, an agency can manage public expectations. Furthermore, agencies can be proactive in understanding how the public may perceive conspiracies around asset recovery. The inability to get “all of the stolen funds back” can be a way for the agency to speak about the importance of prevention. It can be used as an opportunity to

educate the wider public about how important it is to stop corruption before it occurs. And, finally, agencies not only need to manage nonmonetary resources,

but also need to understand how their management will be perceived by the public and to manage the message as part of an overall media strategy.

Definition and Types of Corruption

The definition of “corruption” itself has become corrupted—and that has complicated the problem of how corruption is perceived. Actual corruption and perceived corruption often are regarded as the same thing—but they are not. The perception of corruption influences the reality of corruption, and it can undermine public confidence in the moral authority of political leadership.

When one is able to define what something is, one can understand how to prevent it. However, public debate about corruption often is reduced to blandly labeling an unethical act as corrupt. Such labeling is meaningless. Media commentary often focuses on individual descriptions of scandal, at the expense of a wider, systemic analysis of rules and institutions. It is easier to ignore systemic bankruptcy by condemning the failings of individuals than it is to present an analysis of the social, political, and economic background of corruption. We allow ourselves to become distracted by the personalities of those who commit the crime, and we fail to consider the underlying reasons why the crime occurred in the first place. The focus shifts to those who made the allegations, and away from the allegations themselves. As a consequence, the pattern of incidents repeats itself in different ways, without appropriate analysis or comment. The smallest suspicion of wrongdoing becomes the seed of scandal—a scandal that then feeds on itself. Rumors become allegations, and allegations make front-page stories. Old charges are recounted until new ones emerge. In this way, we become normalized to a distorted perspective of what constitutes information. The systemic reasons for the corruption are lost among the flurry of calls for resignations and investigations.

Corruption is not a new phenomenon, but the intense spotlight aimed at it by international and

domestic actors is novel. The clandestine nature of corruption has prevented the evolution of a universally satisfactory description and explanation of corruption. As a result, defining it is as difficult as measuring it.

The task of anti-corruption agencies is made all the more challenging by the contested definition of corruption that has confused the public’s perception. Complex philosophical and economic considerations have dominated academic discourse on the different theoretical approaches to corruption, but such discourse has been lost on a public more concerned about the practical implications of corrupt behavior.

Failure to explain the distinct types of corruption has prevented the wider public from recognizing the importance of systemic and institutional corruption. As a result, we have a flawed focus on sensational and personality-driven accounts of unethical behavior. In these scenarios, perspective is duly lost to the game of short-term politics. It is easier to sell who is winning and who is losing than to communicate the substantive detail of public issues.

Legal and Moral Corruption

Legal obligations are not the same as moral expectations. A corrupt gain is not the exclusive province of financial reward, and may fall instead into the category of mediated corruption. However, distinctions such as these often are difficult for an outraged public and an impatient media to appreciate fully. Preserving the public trust is not simply a question of discerning legal rights from wrongs; rather, it involves upholding the very spirit of the law. (See case studies E and F.)

Legal definitions of corruption treat it as fixed, as behavior that clearly breaks legal statutes. That definition assumes that all laws are stated precisely,

Case Study E

The Legal and Moral Definitions of Corruption

Flood Corruption Tribunal of Inquiry, Ireland

The Flood Corruption Tribunal of Inquiry (originally named for chair Fergus Flood, but now known as the Mahon Tribunal) was a watershed for Irish political life. It was the first time that the distinction between the legal and moral definitions of corruption received wide-ranging political and public attention.

Ray Burke, the Irish minister for foreign affairs, made an unprecedented personal statement to the Irish House of Parliament in September 1997, in response to media allegations that he was the recipient of large payments from property developers. He said,

As all Members of this House will be aware, the last 25 years have seen a fundamental change in the operation of politics.... Soliciting or accepting such contributions was not outlawed or discouraged through legislation or the Standing Orders or rules of this House.... I am being judged under the rules of 1997 ... although the contribution was received in 1989 when there were no rules in place ... [it] has been the tradition of this House in relation to confidentiality regarding contributions and I do not intend to comment further on the matter.

Burke resigned from his post as minister one month later. The subsequent Flood Tribunal of

Inquiry, established to investigate corruption within the planning process, concluded that the former minister had received corrupt payments of £160,000 (\$242,000). These payments were made by property developers and deposited in Burke's offshore bank accounts. Burke was found to have assisted in the rezoning of land from agricultural to development purposes, making the land extremely valuable for the property developers.

Burke defended the solicitation and acceptance of contributions on the basis that those actions were entirely permitted within the legal parameters of the time. If there were no law, then no law was broken. This justification neglected to take into account that the existing legislation was plainly inadequate. The nature of politics had changed by that time, but the legislation governing politics had not.

Burke failed to acknowledge that his responsibilities to public office included duties to public trust, which bore moral expectations outside of legal obligations. The former minister did not distinguish between his public and private lives, which made it difficult to distinguish a conflict of interest. The Burke case signaled a transformation of Irish political culture. The sharp separation between the public and private lives of politicians was no longer held sacred, and the distinction between legal and moral definitions of corruption became more prominent.

Source: Flood Tribunal of Inquiry, <http://www.flood-tribunal.ie>.

leaving no doubts about their meaning and no discretion to the public officials operating under them. But that is too rigid a description. Although an act is committed within legal boundaries (and so is not legally actionable), the act may lie outside norms of

society (and so be an ethical or moral affront to the citizenry). Merely being technically "legal" does not mean a specific action is not corruption or a specific actor is not corrupt. Corruption is organic, as is how people perceive it.

Case Study F

Marion Barry, Councilmember, Washington, DC

The ongoing difficulties that the former mayor of Washington, DC, Marion Barry, finds himself in demonstrate the intricacies between the legal and moral definitions of corruption. Barry, a colorful and controversial figure who dominated Washington politics, served four terms as mayor. He resigned from office in 1991, following a high-profile conviction for drug possession. After finishing his jail sentence, Barry continued his political career as a Washington city council representative; he continues to serve as a councilmember for one of Washington's local wards.

In July 2009, federal law enforcement officials opened a preliminary investigation of Barry over suspicions that he misappropriated as much as \$1 million. It is alleged that he funneled government grant funding to local community development groups in his area. According to the *Washington CityPaper*, "Virtually every person who has drawn a significant paycheck from the six groups was either a paid staffer or volunteer with Barry's reelection campaign last year" (DeBonis and Cherkis 2009).

There is a potential conflict of interest, given that the nonprofit organizations appear to be run by members of Barry's staff and that the leaders of those organizations also are his personal friends.

Barry has defended his actions, noting that, "There's nothing illegal about me or any other councilmember supporting an organization that they have established if that organization is do-

ing good work and meets the requirements. Tell me where in the rules it says that can't happen" (DeBonis and Cherkis 2009). Barry's spokesperson also said in an interview, "Councilmember Barry resents the insinuation from some members of the press, anti-Barry political opponents, when they suggest that something is wrong or illegal when it is not" (Stephens and Steward 2009).

There are no provisions in the council rules or District of Columbia laws to prohibit a councilmember from appropriating earmarked money for nonprofit entities created by his staff and operating under its oversight. Neither are there any laws to prevent nonprofits from being staffed predominantly by friends and allies of the councilmember.

It also emerged that Barry awarded a city contract to his former girlfriend. "You all think it is inappropriate to hire a girlfriend. I don't think it is. In fact, there is no law against it... As long as it is not illegal, citizens ought to allow people to do what they want," Barry told the *Washington Post* (Craig 2009). Under existing laws, councilmembers are not prohibited from putting family members or people with whom they have personal relationships on the payroll, if those people are qualified for the job.

The legal and moral definitions of corruption continue to pose difficulties in democracies across the world, including the United States' capital city.

Legislating to control behavior focuses on the legality of an action, but not on its morality. Such a legal distinction has opened space for the defense of "I have broken no law; therefore, I have done no wrong." In a legalistic environment, where there is no acknowledgment of personal ethical responsibility, the law always plays catch-up. Criminal laws must be supplemented with administrative rules and ethical guidance.

Modern governance has grown increasingly complex. In turn, anti-corruption legislation has become more intricate. All of these complexities have consequences for anti-corruption agencies. If agencies wish to be successful in their mandate to discourage corrupt behavior, they must adapt to this ever-more-challenging climate.

Figure B Inevitable Intersection on the Road of Life



Source: Universal Press Syndicate, in Lewis and Gilman (2005, p. 57).

Petty and Grand Corruption

Petty corruption, including bribery (by which officials deviate from rules in minor ways for the benefit of themselves or their friends), often is overlooked by the media. Instead, attention is focused on grand corruption—which differs from petty corruption because of the standing and influence of individuals involved and the volume of money being moved. Grand corruption is extensive unethical behavior by public officials that is tolerated by politicians.

The challenge for anti-corruption agencies is to explain to the public the distinctions between petty and grand corruption, with the help of the media. Doing so requires facilitating a more nuanced and coherent communication strategy over the long term—a strategy that can counteract misunderstandings that may undermine the message of an anti-corruption communication campaign. Tailoring communication campaigns to address specific issues can help educate the media on the different manifestations of corruption.

Mediated Corruption

The media struggle with the definition of “mediated corruption” as much as they do with the distinction between the legal and moral definitions of corruption. As a complex, systemic, and global phenomenon, corruption continues to be redefined. As contemporary political and cultural practices transform themselves, so does the conventional definition of corruption, which often has been cited as the abuse of public office for private gain (recall the definition presented in box 1).

“Mediated corruption” expands the traditional assumption of private gain as an essential aspect of corruption. Mediated corruption not only involves a financial benefit; it also takes into consideration other types of gain, such as power, prestige, authority, and symbolic capital through illicit means. Mediated corruption can be explained in these terms:

(1) [T]he gain that the politician receives is political, not personal and is not illegitimate in itself, as in conventional corruption; (2) how the public official provides the benefit is improper, not necessarily the benefit itself, or the fact that the particular citizen receives the benefit; (3) the connection between the gain and the benefit is improper because it damages the democratic process, not because the public official provides the benefit with a corrupt motive. (Thompson 1993, p. 369)

From that perspective, corruption is the use of public office for private gain, without any direct link to a particular favor but in anticipation of future benefits. Mediated corruption may be discovered in the formulation of policy and legislation that is tailored to benefit political actors through popular and political support. That support is the benefit the political actor may receive through the favorable outcome of an election or the secure promotion within the ranks of the political party or government structures. Or, the benefit that the politician gets may be the preservation of existing political support because of a decision not to be forthright during the process of implementing an unpopular policy or legislation.

The Perception of Corruption Indexes

Is the perception of corruption driven by the media? Perception-based corruption indexes may influence the actual perception of corruption because of the media attention they receive, thus raising the possibilities that the indexes influence the very same perceptions on which they are based. This circularity reinforces perceptions of corruption, creating a vicious cycle between perception and fact. Therefore, the perception of corruption does not always reflect the reality or complexity of the actual level or experience of corruption within a country. Because corruption is clandestine in nature, it is also difficult to measure. People who engage in corrupt activities, whether as bribe suppliers or bribe takers, have reasons not to admit to their actions.

Perception matters, however, and its unintended consequences may be devastating to a country's reputation and to its attractiveness to potential foreign investors. For example, the perception that a country has corrupt leadership is likely to make international companies reluctant to allocate foreign direct investment there, and it is likely to discourage donor countries from making loans and grants to support development projects. Both of those situations have enormous consequences for a country's economic growth potential and for its ability to fight poverty.

There is growing concern among anti-corruption agencies that perception-based indexes are not accurate measures. The best perception-based surveys do not always account for indirect effects of subjective factors, and their margins of error are large when compared with actual corruption (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001). And these indexes may be used for political purposes that run counter to the objectives of anti-corruption campaigns.

Transparency International's annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI), first released in 1995, was the initial attempt to measure and compare the corrup-

tion phenomenon on an internationally representative scale. The CPI has been credited widely with putting the issue of corruption on the global policy agenda and raising international awareness about the phenomenon. Nonetheless, the CPI has been the focus of much criticism regarding its methodology (Arndt and Oman 2006; Galtung 2006). For instance, the CPI incorporates surveys that do not contain explicit definitions of the aspects of governance and corruption they intend to measure. Indicators such as "corruption," "conflicts of interest," "diversion of funds," and "anti-corruption efforts and achievements" are difficult to interpret universally; and divergent interpretations clearly have a subsequent impact on country-to-country comparability.

Transparency International itself recommends that negative rankings not incite punishment for a country that is "believed to be corrupt, but is willing to reform"; instead, the organization states that such rankings "should serve as a signal to donors that investment is needed in systemic approaches to fight corruption" (TI 2004). Such warnings often are ignored. Reliance on the indexes also does not reward genuine reformers because the rankings do not provide an indication of political intent or success in the fight against corruption.

Changes in methodology and sample base have complicated year-to-year comparisons. Survey respondents in different countries describe corruption in different terms. Even when countries have similar rankings, their experiences of corruption may be vastly divergent. As the sources used for a country change from year to year, the implicit definitions change; and that complicates same-year comparisons between and among countries (Knack 2006).

One element contributing to the perception of corruption in a country is its ranking in previous perception indexes (Arndt and Oman 2006). There are two main problems: (1) previous survey results

have an impact on the new survey results; and (2) because indexes combine several measurements, it is difficult to set one number that accurately reflects a country's level of corruption. In addition, perception-based corruption indexes often are founded on experts' evaluations of a country's situation. Those experts' perceptions, however, may be influenced by other experts' reports on corruption in a particular country; and those other reports again may be founded on the perception-based indexes from the last year. In such cases, we have a cycle of reports based on other reports, which were based on the first reports! For example, in 2009, an organization asks a panel of experts to rate the prevalence of petty corruption among policemen. The experts base their judgment on perception-based indexes of corruption published by another organization in 2008. Again, the 2010 installment of the index may be based on the 2009 experts' assessment ... and so on (Knack 2006; Andvig 2005; Lambsdorff, Taube, and Schramm 2005).

A single score gives no in-depth information about where corruption occurs or what types of corruption are predominant in a country. The CPI does not measure how much corruption costs either in real terms or in terms of its impact on economic growth. As one prominent academic states, the CPI "can legitimize the case for reform, but it cannot genuinely point reformers in any meaningful direction" (Galtung 2006, p. 123).

Although the World Bank Institute (which publishes Worldwide Governance Indicators) and Transparency International both acknowledge in their annual reports that their indicators are not suited for comparing countries with similar scores and for making comparisons over time, many organizations continue to use these indicators to make exactly such comparisons (Arndt and Oman 2006).

The measuring instruments used by Transparency International and the World Bank Institute frequently are referred to as "composite indexes." They are based on a number of individual data sources intended to measure various aspects of corruption. The sources are aggregated and make use of perception data.¹ This overemphasis on aggregate measures and composite indexes can be counterproductive. Moreover, it is used increasingly for inappropriate purposes—for example, to determine the level of

aid an international aid agency will give to a specific country or to identify potential risks for international investors.

The Impact of Perception-Based Indexes

Perceptions of corruption have real consequences. Foreign investors and international donors use perception-based composite governance indicators to make decisions on vital investment and aid. As a consequence, countries are discriminated against because of perceived trends in their commitments to good governance. There is a bona fide risk that important decisions are being made on the basis of inaccurate measures.

Research has shown that perceptions of corruption discourage private and foreign direct investment and limit economic growth. It is estimated that a one-standard-deviation increase (improvement) in a perception-based corruption index increases investment rates by 3 percent of a country's GDP and increases the annual growth rate of GDP per capita by one percentage point (Mauro 1995, pp. 695–701).

Subjective observations of corruption largely determine business and political operations every day. Foreign investment executives rely on perception-based indicators used by commercial firms that assess political risk (such as Standard and Poor's and Political Risk Services) and on the International Country Risk Guide. The Economist Intelligence Unit, which assesses risk and business attractiveness for more than 180 nations, also uses subjective estimates.

Aid agencies and other stakeholders rely on perception indexes rather than on fact-based assessments to decide their amounts of aid and their areas of investment. A negative CPI ranking may have profoundly negative consequences (Andvig 2005). Indeed, Transparency International acknowledged that a fall in foreign direct investment in Bangladesh may be linked to the country's position at the bottom of its table since 2001 (Williamson 2004).

A 2006 report from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development notes that at least one donor stopped funding a country because of its standing in the CPI (Arndt and Oman 2006, p. 48). That same report also notes that the dominance

of perception indexes may be contributing to the emergence of a “corruption trap.” As development aid is increasingly made conditional on the implementation of reforms, those countries with the least resources to implement “good governance” stand to suffer most from the withdrawal of precisely the support they need to stand any realistic chance of tackling corruption. In this way, perception-based indexes can become entirely counterproductive.

Examples of Inconsistent Perception

With all the inconsistencies already cited, the media are faced with the tremendous challenge of deciphering these indexes. That is the principal reason why anti-corruption agencies should have a strong media relations strategy in place. Indeed, the potentially far-reaching impact of perception-based indexes should be a genuine source of concern for anti-corruption agencies. Such indexes do not reveal the real context of a situation, and may even be counterproductive to a nation’s efforts to develop its economy and improve its citizens’ standards of living. An inverse effect may occur under which countries are discouraged from undertaking serious anti-corruption measures because their attempts at reform are neither revealed nor regarded as successful by an improved score in the CPI. Perception indexes can punish rather than reward solid reform. The complexity of understanding how to interpret these indexes places the responsibility on anti-corruption agencies to explain index ratings to the media.

Some people have argued that the gap between the perception of corruption and the personal experience of corruption can exceed expectations. When perception-based and experience-based surveys have been compared, vast discrepancies have been found between people’s perceptions and people’s actual experience of the extent of corruption in a given country (Donchev and Ujhelyi 2007; Miller, Grodeland, and Koshechkina 2001).

Since 2002, Transparency International has supplemented the CPI with the Global Corruption Barometer, a series of individual-level, national probability surveys assessing general public attitudes toward and experience of corruption in personal, business, and political life; educational and legal systems; medical services; police, registry, and permit

services; utilities services; and tax revenue offices. It is significant that this survey distinguishes between the perception and the experience of corruption, and may be more reflective of the “echo-chamber” effect in which perceptions of corruption can be shaped by entrenched historical stereotypes or media reports regarded as fact by the population surveyed.

When the CPI and the Global Corruption Barometer are compared with one another, it is obvious that perception and experience of corruption are not the same things. Studies have shown that “the ‘distance’ between opinions and experiences varies haphazardly from country to country” (Abramo 2008, p. 6). Table 1 illustrates this point by showing the scores on perceived corruption (CPI column) and experienced corruption (Global Corruption Barometer column) for Turkey and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom is rated number 11 in the 2006 perception-based CPI, and Turkey is rated number 60. Apparently, there is a huge gap in the perception of corruption in the two countries, with Turkey being perceived as significantly more corrupt than the United Kingdom. However, when it comes to the experience-based questions on the Global Corruption Barometer, there is little reason to distinguish between the two countries. In both states, 98 percent of the respondents stated that they had not paid any bribe in the past 12 months. In terms of corruption actually experienced, Turkey and the United Kingdom appear to have equally low levels of corruption. The incompatibility of corruption perception with the experience of corruption points to the shortcomings of the perception methodology used.

The disparity between the perception and the experience of corruption is also relevant in the case of Ireland. From 1995 to 2002, Ireland’s ranking on the CPI dropped from 11 to 23, a decrease of 12 places. During that same period, extensive legislative reform occurred in Ireland. An independent anti-corruption agency was established to monitor implementation of the newly introduced legislative framework. Moreover, three tribunals of inquiry were created to investigate Irish political corruption dating back as far as the 1970s and 1980s. Perhaps the Irish public assumed that there was more corruption because they were hearing more about corruption in those years—and that prompted the significant drop in Ireland’s CPI number. But the correlation between

actual levels and the people's perceptions of corruption was not necessarily accurate because the corruption tribunals were investigating incidents from an entirely different time period.

All of these examples point to the need for anti-corruption agencies to learn to communicate effectively with the media, and, through the media, with the public.

Anti-corruption Agencies as Victims of Their Own Success

Anti-corruption agencies often are victims of their own success. There often is a correlation between the quantity of corruption cases uncovered and

the degree of citizen perception that corruption has become a major problem in society. That is, the more cases an agency exposes, the more people think that corruption is rampant. This inaccurate assumption is a growing challenge for agencies because the political cost may inhibit, not stimulate, support for anti-corruption campaigns (see case study G).

The irony is that, although implementing a high-profile anti-corruption campaign may reduce the level of actual corruption, it simultaneously increases public awareness and perceptions of corruption. The frequency with which citizens are exposed to corrupt acts and reports about the occurrence of corruption has a bearing on public perception.

Table 1 Inconsistent Perception between Two Indexes				
Corruption Perception Index, 2006			Global Corruption Barometer, 2006	
			<i>In the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?</i>	
Country	Ranking	Score (out of 10.0)	Percent Answering Yes	Percent Answering No
Turkey	60	3.8	2	98
United Kingdom	11	8.6	2	98

Case Study G

Anti-corruption Agencies as Victims of Their Own Success and the Power of Perception The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) analyzed the anti-corruption activities of 24 postcommunist transition countries in Eastern and Central Europe and the Caucasus between 1999 and 2002. The bank researched three types of anti-corruption programs to identify their effectiveness in addressing the perception of corruption: omnibus anti-corruption initiatives, specific legislative reform aimed at tackling corruption, and adherence to international anti-corruption conventions.

The expectation was that the public's perception of corruption decreases as the intensity of an anti-corruption campaign increases because of the belief that something is being done to reduce corruption. The EBRD research found, however, that "higher profile anti-corruption programs may only serve to draw attention to the severity of the problem, driving perceptions in the opposite direction."

Thus, perceptions of corruption—measured in terms of the degree to which firms consider corruption to be an obstacle to the operation and growth of their business—actually are "positively correlated with the intensity of anti-corruption programmes." This suggests that high-profile anti-corruption initiatives may have the inverse effect

of increasing, rather than reducing, the perception of entrenched unethical behavior.

Why is there a relatively strong and significant positive correlation between anti-corruption activities and higher perceptions of corruption? The EBRD research proposes that omnibus programs, in particular, tend to raise the profile and visibility of corruption, without necessarily providing any immediate or "deep" changes in the levels of corruption within a country.

The research stresses the importance of drafting and implementing effective laws regulating the civil service, public procurement, financial disclosure, money laundering, and political party financing; and of promoting freedom of information. It also indicates that merely signing international covenants and joining anti-corruption-related transnational organizations are unlikely to have a direct impact on levels and perceptions of corruption. Effective coordination and coalition building and stronger incentives for governments to comply with anti-corruption principles may be more productive. This is also the case for stakeholder input and participation by civil society groups in formulating and monitoring such initiatives.

Source: Steves and Rousso 2003.

Media Framing

“Framing” is a term that means communicating in a way that leads audiences to see something in a certain light or from a particular perspective. Effective framing taps into preexisting beliefs, attitudes, and opinions; it highlights certain aspects of an issue over other aspects. How an issue is framed is crucial for anti-corruption work—in fact, it even may determine the success or failure of an anti-corruption campaign. By learning how to frame their messages most effectively, anti-corruption agencies can use the media as a vehicle to drive their campaigns. The media can become tools for focusing public attention on the real issues and consequences of integrity lapses rather than on ancillary matters. What is said and how it is said can shape how people perceive the facts of a news story.

The topic of climate change is a great example of how message framing can alter public opinion. For instance, replacing the term “global warming” with the broader term “climate change” expanded the topic and enabled people to consider different aspects of the issue. Because different aspects call for different solutions, opportunities were opened to address a range of relevant factors.

Framing helps us make sense of our circumstances. When an event or issue is described, the speaker can emphasize certain considerations and ignore others. People hearing that speaker then will focus on the aspects that the speaker emphasized. A study undertaken in Africa in 2002 revealed that the media often used negative and derogatory descriptions when reporting on diseases such as HIV/AIDS. In contrast, they used no negative terms or examples and no derogatory language in reporting on diseases such as tuberculosis (Pratt, Ha, and Pratt 2002). As a consequence of the way in which the media framed the topic in a negative light, it is likely that people with HIV/AIDS were seen in a negative way by people who heard or read the reports. Tuberculosis patients

were more likely to have received sympathy from those same people.


Many different frames can be used in describing the work of anti-corruption agencies. Below, we will consider three pairs of alternative frames: episodic vs. thematic, issue vs. strategic, and gain vs. loss.

Episodic vs. Thematic Framing

When news is reported in the form of specific events or particular cases, the framing is episodic. Citizens receiving episodic reports are less likely to consider society responsible for the events, and more likely to think that individuals are responsible. In contrast, when political issues and events are presented in a general or collective context, the framing is thematic. Citizens receiving thematic reports are less likely to hold individuals accountable, and more likely to believe that society is responsible.

Research has shown that when citizens viewed media stories about poverty featuring homeless or unemployed people (episodic framing), they were more likely to blame poverty on individual failings, such as laziness or low levels of education. Those people who viewed media stories about high national rates of unemployment or poverty (thematic framing), however, were less likely to place blame on individual failings; instead, they attributed responsibility to governmental policies and other factors beyond the victims’ control (Iyengar 1991).

Journalists often employ episodic frames in their work. Instead of providing information about background and long-term implications, they focus on the most recent developments, frequently isolated from one another. As a result, audiences develop domain-specific knowledge rather than general knowledge. Agencies working with the media to get their information out will find that messages with episodic frames may be more appealing to the

Figure C

Source: Leonski, Flickr Creative Commons, <http://www.flickr.com/photos/leonski/537513221>.

media. But those messages will not place the information in any context.

Issue vs. Strategic Framing

A news story that focuses on describing a specific problem or policy has an issue frame. A strategic frame, however, emphasizes the process by which something happens. For instance, putting an issue frame on the topic of corruption would entail explaining how much corrupt behavior occurs in a specific country and sector, who the typical culprits are, and so forth. Putting the topic in a strategic frame would require looking at how corruption is discovered, what sanctions can be imposed, and what the anti-corruption agency is doing to fight the problem. Because framing determines where the audience puts its attention, a strategic frame will be more effective when the goal is to promote the work of anti-corruption agencies.

In some research studies, strategic framing prompted cynicism among the audience. News reports that showed “the game of politics”—strategic discussions and arguments between politicians and experts rather than real issues—made the audience more weary of both politics and politicians (Cappella and Jamieson 1997).

Gain vs. Loss Framing

A topic presented in describing good things that will happen when something specific is done has a gain frame. In the health sector, for example, authorities trying to motivate people to be screened for cancer as a means of early detection show a happy family secure in the knowledge that all its members are healthy or that the disease was detected when it was still curable. Gain frames often prompt audiences to be hopeful and feel good, and motivate them to act in a certain way to realize some benefit. A loss frame, by contrast, is a more urgent call to action, pointing out specific dangers or risks when certain actions are not taken. In a loss frame, the health message about cancer screening would portray a family grieving for a loved one lost because cancer was not detected in time to treat it. Loss frames generate negative feelings in their audiences, but they also point out the urgency of a topic or action.

There are many other frames that may be used when communicating about corruption. For instance, anti-corruption agencies may communicate ethical aspects (corruption is wrong) or material aspects (corruption makes your family poorer). The choice of frame depends on an agency’s goal in spreading the word. Corruption surely is an ethical issue, but people may be more motivated to stand against it when they see that it affects their own material well-being.

In general, agencies should first choose the aspects of corruption they want to emphasize, and then decide whether to evoke negative or positive emotions in the audience. Positive frames inspire hope, and negative frames are better suited to expressing the urgency of anti-corruption measures. Negative emotions also limit the audience’s memory because people experiencing them will remember fewer facts from a message (see Lerner and Tiedens [2006]). However, negative frames also are more likely to grab people’s attention.

Here is an important caveat: Don’t mix opposing frames in one message. Don’t put both an episodic and a thematic frame in one message, or both a gain and a loss frame. The effects of opposing frames will cancel each other. Two similar frames in one message, however, will enhance the effect that each frame produces.

Building Coalitions

Why should anti-corruption agencies engage in building coalitions? Agencies are not merely public organizations working in isolation. Instead, they should see themselves as institutions active in the public sphere where building coalitions and shaping public opinion are part and parcel of their own survival and effectiveness (Lewis and Gilman 2005).

Long-term systemic change in an institution where corrupt behavior has been the norm requires a coalition of reform-minded supporters. Institutional failings are either the consequence or the cause of a bankrupt political culture. When severe underlying problems go unnoticed over a period of time, it is often because citizens have become normalized to entrenched behavior that is assumed to be beyond reproach. Efforts to counter such deep-seated reluctance to recognize or support the need for bona fide systemic change are strengthened when coalitions work together to manage and sustain reform.

Building coalitions is an effective way to guard against the threat of counterreform by vested interests. Successful and sustainable reform is vulnerable to capture by such interests. Coalitions are able to mitigate these challenges by: providing a shared platform for like-minded, pro-change individuals and groups; leveraging the collective force of their members and influential allies; focusing the public spotlight on advocacy issues in the public arena; and applying pressure for effective implementation of reform among leadership circles, within bureaucratic environments, and in the larger public sphere.

What Are Coalitions?

Coalitions are structures of formal collaboration motivated by a common vision, seeking to attain common goals. Coalitions work together to share

information, influence, and material resources. They may include individuals, groups, and organizations that arrange joint activities and collaborate in setting up some entity to further shared objectives. Coalitions recognize that collective action is more powerful than disparate efforts carried out by lone champions and loosely affiliated groups. Key considerations in coalition-building efforts include research, networking, lobbying, and mass outreach activities.

Anti-corruption agencies can motivate potential stakeholders to join a broad coalition by crafting messages that resonate with the belief in collective efficacy—the belief that, united as a group, it is possible to make a real difference. Stimulating a sense of collective solidarity and affirming a sense of shared purpose can be a powerful inspiration in coalition building.

The identification of key political stakeholders is critical to a strong anti-corruption coalition. The first challenge in building anti-corruption alliances is to identify individuals, groups, and organizations whose goals and values are similar to those of the agency. (See case study H concerning the Boy Scouts in the Philippines for a noteworthy example.) Core stakeholders are people essential to the organization or process. If coalitions include sympathetic government ministers, these “internal champions” can work toward consensus within the government, and consensus can act as a counterbalance to opposition from public officials, other ministers, and middle-managers. Internal hostility toward proposed reform very often is underestimated (Marsh 1998), and having a countering force in place when hostility arises is helpful.

An effective anti-corruption coalition helps build and maintain momentum by promoting a participatory approach that relies on dialogue among stakeholders. Such dialogue should rest

Case Study H

Defining Coalitions

The Boy Scouts in the Philippines

One challenge for an anti-corruption agency is to identify organizations whose goals, values, and development philosophies are similar to its own. Highly effective networks and coalitions can be created with unexpected partners.

At the 2008 anti-corruption learning event in Vienna, Austria, José Edgardo Campos, lead public sector specialist at the World Bank, outlined a case in the Philippines where the Boy Scouts organization was recruited to ensure that textbooks reached school districts.

Boy Scouts were informed through an SMS (short message service) communication that they should receive a certain number of textbooks. They then were encouraged to check with their

school district and to send an SMS with the information about the number of books that actually were received and when they were received. The Boy Scouts were motivated to take part in this exercise because they were affected directly by the provision of textbooks and would have to bear the negative consequences of not receiving them.

The participation costs were low and the process was straightforward, but the consequences were profound. This strategy provided an effective check on corruption within the school administration sector, and made clear the direct consequences of corruption among the wider public.

Source: Presentation at the anti-corruption learning event, “Using Communication Approaches and Techniques to Support Anti-Corruption Efforts,” convened by the World Bank’s Communication for Governance and Accountability Program and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna, Austria, in November 2008.

on the principles of inclusion, openness, tolerance, empowerment, and transparency (Pederson 2006). Building a coalition requires strong foundations of trust among the different stakeholders. The need for time and hard work in developing this trust should not be understated.

A coalition that wishes to sustain the reform process must: understand the underlying political landscape; build ownership within government (including by recruiting champions in the legislature); address the collective action problem among key stakeholders by making a special effort to unite and motivate all parties; and, finally, solidify core advocacy groups and generate broad public support through a robust media campaign. This is why a good relationship with the media is crucial to the success of any anti-corruption agency’s agenda. A good relationship sustains momentum, mobilizes public consensus in favor of reform, and anticipates potential opposition to that agenda.

How Are Coalitions Formed?

There is no one right way to build strong coalitions. However, experiences from around the world suggest that successful and sustained reform is increased if anti-corruption agencies consider the following stages in the process of coalition building and functioning (CommGAP 2009):

1. **Issue identification and specification:** At this initial point, the overall problem and the reform objective are articulated and broken down for detailed analysis; policy options are defined along a continuum from minimum to maximum reform positions; and particular stakeholders either may support these options or may find them unpalatable.
2. **Relationship/stakeholder mapping:** Significant actors are identified, and positions on key and related issues are plotted, especially regard-

ing the policy options identified in the previous stage.

3. **Core membership formation:** The core of a coalition is convinced about and becomes self-aware of the benefits of change; core actors are organized; early leaders and champions are identified; and the joint agenda takes shape.
4. **Demonstration of credibility:** The coalition demonstrates that it is knowledgeable about relevant issues, can act effectively, and is worthy of support from stakeholders.
5. **Purposeful expansion:** At this critical point, a small organization builds a broader social and resource base while retaining coherence and effectiveness.
6. **Sustainable transformation:** By this stage, the coalition has grown and become polycentric,

with initiatives on many fronts, drawing strength from many sources (pp. 395–96).

An example of these stages can be found in case study I, concerning the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau of Singapore.

The Communication Dimensions of Coalition Building

Building a coalition requires effective communication. This communication may include facilitating networks among like-minded political elites; fostering deliberation, dialogue, and debate among multiple stakeholders; measuring and informing public opinion; and building support among diverse interest publics and the general citizenry.

Case Study I

How Are Coalitions Formed?

The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau of Singapore

The stages of coalition building outlined in this practical guide were recognized by the Singapore Ministry of Home Affairs. Singapore's anti-corruption agency, the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB; <http://www.cpiib.gov.sg>), is an independent government body with a mandate to prevent corruption in both the public and private spheres. The Political and Economic Risk Consultancy and Transparency International consistently have ranked Singapore as one of the least corrupt city-states in Asia and the world.

Part of this success is attributed to regular local partnership forums with agencies that the CPIB has identified as particularly prone to corruption. Public awareness of corruption has led to responsiveness to stakeholder demand for action and transparency in the reform process. A broad-based consensus and stakeholder mobilization success-

fully led to a review of work procedures in government departments. The CPIB also enlisted the public to participate actively in the anti-corruption campaign by inviting feedback on Internet-based campaigns.

Sharing successes allows anti-corruption coalitions to learn from each other. Networks fail when cooperation is withheld and supremacy among the different institutions becomes a priority. A multistakeholder approach is most advantageous when it is proactive.

In 1987, the "Home Team" approach was adopted. It vastly improved cooperation and minimized competition among a variety of agencies, including the Singapore police force, the civil defense force, the Immigration Checkpoints Authority, the Central Narcotics Bureau, the Singapore Prison Service, and the ministry headquarters.

Source: Presentation at the anti-corruption learning event, "Using Communication Approaches and Techniques to Support Anti-Corruption Efforts," convened by the World Bank's Communication for Governance and Accountability Program and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna, Austria, in November 2008.

Effective communication in support of coalition building helps secure, strengthen, and sustain political will at various bureaucratic levels. Firm political will becomes particularly important when unpopular decisions must be made in the public interest. The leveraging of shared resources enables coalitions to inform and cultivate support among various publics more effectively. Inclusive and participatory approaches made possible by coalitions create a consensus for reform; and that consensus, in turn, increases the likelihood that change efforts will be successful and sustainable.

Effective communication is an essential component that must be deployed judiciously in different combinations and sequences, depending on particular coalitions' needs and stages of formation. Each of the coalition-building stages implies certain communication activities:

1. **Issue identification and specification:** Communication efforts should focus on gauging public opinion and consulting with policy experts to identify the national mood (Rosner 2008), public discourse, and policy options surrounding the reform initiative. *Use public opinion research methods and key informant interviews.*
2. **Relationship/stakeholder mapping:** Communication efforts should focus on listening to actors and key informants and using and analyzing public opinion data to determine the positions of the general public as well as its subgroups. *Use public opinion research methods, key informant interviews, and network analysis.*
3. **Core membership formation:** Communication efforts should focus on lobbying and persuading influential individuals and key targets, and on gaining a deeper understanding of their positions and trade-offs. *Use lobbying and persuasion techniques.*
4. **Demonstration of credibility:** Communication/ messages should focus on the successes to date (even small ones), but the messages should be framed as much as possible in terms of the interests and incentives of the core membership and key stakeholders; the coalition also should demonstrate mastery of the issues surrounding the reform. *Use issue framing and media relations techniques.*
5. **Purposeful expansion:** Communication efforts should shift toward addressing the interests of relevant but broader issue and policy networks. *Use framing for collective action and networking approaches.*
6. **Sustainable transformation:** Communication efforts should broaden to include appeals to the general public, especially addressing social norms. *Use framing for collective action and media relations techniques.*

These communication initiatives create the conditions necessary to build trust, especially during formative stages of coalition building, and they leverage diversity to make the most of a coalition's broad membership (see tool 3).

Issues That Must Be Addressed

The quality and effectiveness of media performance regarding corruption are affected by the political, economic, and legal contexts in which the media operate. Critical factors include media freedom to access, verify, and publish accurate information; independent media ownership and the ability to access nonpartisan sources of financing; competition; credibility; and outreach.

Several problems make working with the media difficult. For instance, media operating in a country where there is no freedom of expression may not be able to report on government corruption. The availability and breadth of media channels also may present challenges. Communication strategies must consider which media reach the largest audience, the rural audience, or whatever specific demographic the anti-corruption coalition wishes to inform. Journalists' ability to get necessary information to substantiate or further explain an anti-corruption message poses another problem where access is limited. Furthermore, there are issues inherent in the journalism profession that could hamper cooperation between anti-corruption agencies and media outlets. For example, journalists work under acute pressures of time and market—they need to meet deadlines and attract as large an audience as possible. Agencies intending to mount successful media campaigns to counter corrupt behavior need to be aware of these potential problems, address them when possible, and find solutions to circumvent them if immediate change is not possible.

Freedom of Expression and Freedom of the Press

In Nigeria, political, economic, legislative, and professional factors undermine future development of the television, radio, and print sectors. The research report on Nigeria produced by the BBC World Ser-

vice Trust's African Media Development Initiative found that the government exerts undue control and regulation through the National Broadcasting Commission, the Nigerian Press Council, the National Communications Commission, and various laws and edicts. The absence of media freedom there undermines journalists' ability to investigate and report incidences of corruption (Okwori and Adeyanju 2006).

The perception of government interference and a lack of a truly independent judiciary in Nigeria may encourage a culture of self-censorship within a profession that already is in crisis because of shortfalls in equipment and training. The research report also found an increasing intolerance of divergent opinions among ruling politicians. Despite the 1999 advent of a more democratic era under civilian rule, instances of harassment and intimidation of journalists are common. When journalists and media outlets are faced with threats of imprisonment, censure, sedition, defamation, expensive libel laws, license revocation, or loss of government-controlled advertising revenue, the incentive to expose and report corruption is diminished. Similar problems have been identified in Uganda, where the continued existence of criminal sanctions for alleged media offenses remains repressive (Khamalwa 2006).

The widespread existence and use of "insult laws" have resulted in the imprisonment of journalists under dubious circumstances in a variety of countries. In Uruguay, for example, the *desacato* law was used by the state to vindicate the honor of a foreign head of state. The editor-in-chief of the Montevideo daily newspaper *La República* and his brother, the managing editor, were charged with insulting Paraguay's President Juan Carlos Wasmosy in a 1996 article that alleged Wasmosy's involvement in corruption in the construction of the Itaipu hydroelectric power plant on the border between Paraguay and Brazil. The brothers were convicted and sentenced to two

years in prison, but were acquitted in a subsequent retrial (Walden 2002).

The state has multiple methods of exerting discreet control over the media landscape. It closely can monitor the activities of nongovernmental organizations or drag its feet on introducing legislation to protect freedom of expression and access to information. Another barrier to press freedom is a weak independent regulatory system.

Access to Information

Access to information is another basic civil right that affects the success of the media investigating and reporting on corruption issues. Journalists need reliable and verifiable information to make substantiated claims about corrupt behavior. In many countries, however, governments uphold a culture of secrecy where little information is released to journalists or to the public at large.

In Thailand, there has been some success in getting access to needed information. Using the Thailand Official Information Act, advocacy groups and journalists were able to obtain records of the National Counter Corruption Commission's investigations of Deputy Public Health Minister Rakkiart Sukthana and two senior officials. The 1999 Ministry of Public Health scandal involved the procurement of medical supplies worth \$35 million. Since the media intervened in the case, public awareness of the potential efficacy of the information act has had a significant effect on the government's culture of secrecy, prompting increased government efficiency by allowing public scrutiny of government agencies. Citizens were empowered with the knowledge that they had a right to information (Chongkittavorn 2002).

Changing Media Landscape

In order to be successful, communicators must always be aware of today's changing media landscape. The rapid spread of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) has opened up entirely new avenues for communication to and from citizens. Online communication is relatively cheap and easily accessible if the necessary infrastructure is available. ICTs, in particular the Internet and mobile phones, make it possible to overcome several communica-

tion problems, such as access to information and outreach.

In July 2007, TRACE International (TRACE) launched the website www.bribe.org, which takes advantage of the accessibility and anonymity of the Internet to aid the global fight against corruption. The site, named the Business Registry for International Bribery and Extortion line (BRIBELine), provides a space where organizations and their members can safely and anonymously report cases of bribery against the government officials they had dealt with. Users are asked to fill in an online survey with information about the kind of bribe that was requested, the kind of favor that was asked for in return for the bribe, and the kind of official who solicited the bribe. Only a month after its launch, BRIBELine had already received more than 1,000 bribery reports from almost 100 countries. The success of the portal shows that an appropriate forum—that is easy to access and comes with little danger of repercussions—will indeed motivate people to share information about their experiences of corruption. BRIBELine publishes an annual report that spotlights corruption and also encourages governments to reduce corruption among public officials.

The Brazilian government hosts an online portal, *Portal da Transparência*, which accounts for all money transfers initiated by the government, including a list of all people receiving government benefits. The portal has a wide reach with about 720,000,000 people registered as of 2008 and more than 110,000 accesses per month in 2008. This website allows the public as well as the media to monitor government expenditure and thereby provides mechanisms to spot corrupt behavior within government.

ICTs, however, are only useful where citizens have access to them. Online communication is unlikely to reach citizens in very poor and remote areas. When planning a communication strategy, anti-corruption agencies must be aware which media are the most likely to reach their target groups. In areas with wide cell phone coverage, a text message service may be appropriate, whereas areas with high illiteracy may be better served by communication through radio. Better educated segments of the population tend to read more newspapers, whereas television is still the major medium for citizens in many cities. Before implementing any communication strategy,

therefore, it is important to identify the media that reach the largest part of the intended target group.

Outreach

An anti-corruption media strategy must take into account the limitations of potential media outreach. In many African countries, independent media are limited in their ability to inform the public, particularly in rural areas. Instead, government-owned media and commercially driven enterprises that focus on entertainment and religious content rather than news inhibit the ability of the media to act as an instrument of public accountability.

South Africa's print media has been financially successful because of growing advertising revenues that have promoted a profit-motivated media culture, particularly among tabloid newspapers. Sensationalized gossip and scandal-focused content sell newspapers at the expense of an editorial focus on public service obligations. The high costs of broadband connectivity have created a digital divide that determines access by social class. The absence of media infrastructure can prove challenging and may prevent even the most basic participation by the audience. Nine million South Africans live in what President Thabo Mbeki identified in 2001 as nodal points for rural development and urban regeneration. That number includes the poorest of the poor: only three quarters of households have a radio, and only one third have a television. In some areas, newspapers are read by less than 20 percent of the population (Milne and Taylor 2006, p. 54). South Africa shares similar characteristics with Uganda, where just 10–25 percent of the population reads newspapers (Nogara 2009, p. 5). In Bangladesh—a country with a population of some 130 million—the combined circulation of all newspapers does not exceed 1 million (Anam 2002, p. 273). Apart from literacy barriers, newspaper circulation predominantly is limited to urban areas because of high publication and distribution costs (Nogara 2009).

However, countries with relatively low media penetration rates can achieve enormous success, and such success has significant consequences for a large number of people. In Kenya, despite a low newspaper penetration rate of 9 per 1,000 people, the local press instigated a corruption investigation

that led to a minister's resignation (Islam, Djankov, and McLeish 2002, p. 16).

Competition

Newsrooms of privately owned media enterprises are vulnerable to capture by commercial interests, and state-owned media are vulnerable to political interests. A research study has found strong correlations between private media ownership and higher levels of government accountability and performance (Islam, Djankov, and McLeish 2002). The study, carried out in 98 countries, examined the effects of media ownership on a variety of social and economic policy outcomes, including government accountability and corruption. Corruption was found to be lower in countries with fewer state-owned newspapers. (No effect was found for television.) Government ownership of media restricts the flow of information about corruption to the public because the government is likely to protect its own interests by not revealing any information that could be used to criticize it. Private competition stimulates alternative views and holds state-owned media to account for the information that those media impart to media consumers.

Other empirical studies have found strong evidence that competition in the media has a significant impact on the reduction of corruption, and may even be a stronger determinant than freedom of expression (Suphachalasai 2005). Moreover, corruption may be correlated negatively with foreign ownership of the media (Besley and Prat 2006). Foreign ownership may be correlated with factors that make the media more effective at generating information.

The success of media in advancing public accountability often depends on a positive and constructive relationship with a country's political leadership. In Uganda, for example, the media were particularly effective in combating corruption in the 1980s and early 1990s, when their anti-corruption drive was in line with the leadership's objectives to carry out dramatic reforms in the public sector. This partnership approach initiated parliamentary investigations into blatant corruption among officials and created support among the political elites for the government's far-reaching reforms. The media provoked a public outcry that helped build internal and international consensus around a

then-new leadership. The fact that the government subsequently exercised considerable discretion to block the prosecution of corruption cases (Nogara 2009) raises the question of whether anti-corruption rhetoric was used to advance political objectives other than accountability.

Motivation

Motivation is a key factor necessary for the success of investigative journalism. In some cases, the motivation is provided by recognition and reward. The Danish International Development Agency, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, the U.K. Department for International Development, and others have provided Uganda's Makerere University with funding for annual investigative journalism awards. Monica Chibita, senior lecturer at the university, believes the awards have "had the effect of giving journalists courage and recognizing them for their efforts in exposing social ills, fighting corruption, and the promotion of good governance" (Khamalwa 2006). Anti-corruption agencies also can give awards to journalists to recognize coverage of corruption. Agencies can establish a regular competition, asking journalists to submit their stories on corruption-related issues to a jury. The jury then picks the best reporting. Awards may be small financial contributions or a nominal appreciation of the journalists' work (such as a certificate of achievement). In these ways, journalists not only are encouraged to report on corruption, but also come to perceive the agency as beneficial for their careers.

In Thailand, for more than four decades, the Thai Journalists Association has given prestigious awards to journalists who have revealed corruption scandals. In 2000, a journalist exposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's fraudulent asset declaration, which led to the politician's indictment. Thaksin was found to have illegally hidden \$53 million worth of shares in his telecommunications company through a false stock transfer to his servants (Chongkittavorn 2002, p. 262). Rewarding investigative journalism motivates journalists to deal with difficult issues such as corruption and to risk the anger of leading politicians. By giving awards, the professional association signals clearly that it stands behind investigative journalists and encourages thorough journalistic effort.

Promoting Professionalism and Credibility: Influencing Media Bias

The BBC World Service Trust's African Media Development Initiative points to the "generally low levels of professional, ethical, management and technical standards in the media sector in Africa" (AMDI 2006, p. 79). These basic needs must be met if countries are to establish a robust media landscape. In particular, low levels of remuneration and status can inhibit one's motivation and ability to innovate. In Senegal, the average pay for journalists (\$300 a month) is half that of state teachers (AMDI 2006, p. 135). This has created a culture of "per diem-ization" and "brown envelope" journalism, and a skills exodus (in which nongovernmental organizations and donor agencies unwittingly diminish the journalism profession by poaching its best practitioners).

It may be naïve to assume that a poorly paid journalist will act to expose those who became wealthy through corruption. The establishment of professional standards and development of credible accreditation systems for training initiatives would offset poor-quality and biased reporting, which can be counterproductive to corruption-fighting efforts. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, internal political strife has prompted newspapers to adopt particular political positions that are apparent in their editorial tone (Mweze 2006).

The private media's priority on publishing and selling news can feed the public perception that there is a media bias against the government—a perception that sometimes is justified. Who watches the watchdog? What are the challenges when press law does not provide for free and independent media?

The best defense against being investigated and charged is to attack anti-corruption efforts, so some corrupt leaders own big media corporations (television, radio, press agencies, or newspapers). In contrast, the media may have their own covert agenda in uprooting particular leaders who are thought to be corrupt. Allegations reported by media with a hidden objective may not be true.

In Uganda, for example, private media frequently have been associated with the political opposition to the ruling party. A growing number of policy makers, officials, and media practitioners increasingly are concerned that commercial and

potentially corrupt media outlets in Africa might become a source of sensationalist, inaccurate, and even false reporting that can prompt sectarian or political tensions. In a 2004 Afrobarometer survey carried out in 15 African countries, 53 percent of respondents expressed trust in the government broadcasting service, whereas only 43 percent expressed trust in private FM radio or television stations. Public and private newspapers scored 37 percent and 36 percent, respectively (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2004, pp. 208–10).

Initiatives to consider when endeavoring to counter media bias and promote professionalism among journalists include establishing programs and forums where anti-corruption and media stakeholders can share practical experiences with their coun-

terparts in different countries. Such cross-fertilization of experiences could provide access to new campaign techniques and a better appreciation of different approaches to communication. It would particularly benefit stakeholders in countries where knowledge of communication techniques is weak because of an undeveloped media environment, a relatively new anti-corruption agency, or a developing civil society. The objectives of these programs and forums would be to create an enabling environment for anti-corruption stakeholders, to build capacity and increase quality by enhancing knowledge, and to raise awareness of the variety of potential partners. One of the learning outcomes would be that it is important to plan communication initiatives against corruption strategically and for the long term.

Pragmatic Media Actions for Anti-corruption Agencies

How can anti-corruption agencies respond to demands of the media without compromising the integrity and confidentiality of their information? The best defense here is a good offense. A well-thought-out media strategy is proactive, anticipating potential media queries and preparing responses. Agencies can build solid relationships with the media by continually demonstrating transparency, accountability, and openness in how they communicate.

Given the complexity of corruption, communication strategies should not be restricted to informing people and persuading them to change their attitudes or behaviors. It also should be used to facilitate dialogue, build trust, and ensure mutual understanding.

The particular experience of the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC) is an illustrative example. At a November 2008 anti-corruption learning event held in Vienna, Austria, a representative of the KACC described how the agency established a media strategy in response to negative publicity. Appropriate media channels were identified, contacted, and informed about the KACC's role and mandate. As a result of this direct approach, a better working relationship developed between the agency and the media, the flow of accurate information to the public was increased, and citizens became better informed about the KACC's activities.

Pathways to Achieving Positive Communication Impact

To design and evaluate communication strategies that promote public support for the work of anti-corruption agencies, it is essential to have a model of how such an intervention is expected to work. Different terms for such a model include "logic model," "conceptual framework," "program model,"

and "outcome line." Such a model serves many useful purposes:

- > It illustrates the chain of events that must take place to achieve the desired change in public support. Such change can be a greater awareness of the work of anti-corruption agencies, a change in people's attitudes toward that work and toward corruption, or a change in people's behavior with regard to corruption.
- > It makes explicit (and thus opens for discussion) the implicit assumptions about how communication can affect people's awareness, attitudes, and behavior regarding corruption.
- > It provides stakeholders with a vision of the different components within an anti-corruption project.
- > It gives managers guidance about where to invest their resources, and helps them avoid squandering funds on communication activities that lead nowhere.
- > It gives evaluators clear guidance about what elements of the anti-corruption communication campaign they should track to determine if the project achieves its objectives.
- > It enables evaluators to test and document why a given anti-corruption communication intervention achieved its desired objectives; conversely, evaluators can identify where a given intervention broke down if it fell short of achieving its objectives.

A logic model provides a coherent framework for the different phases of planning a communication strategy; it is similar (but not identical) to the road map for planning a communication strategy depicted in the "Tools" section of this paper. In addition to these planning steps, the logic model helps in deriving specific communication objectives from broader objectives in the work of anti-corruption

agencies. It also clarifies the challenges that need to be overcome to reach the overall goal, which may be addressed through communication measures.

The logic model in figure 1 begins with spelling out the *overall objectives* of an anti-corruption project—for instance, “reducing corruption by promoting transparency and accountability of public institutions.” (Figure 1 outlines the general framework of a logic model, whereas figure 2 applies the model to a possible objective of anti-corruption agencies.) The next step in the model addresses the *challenges* that may hinder reaching the project goal and that are *related to communication*. Specifically regarding anti-corruption efforts, we can identify two challenges: (1) civil society and the media are not sufficiently educated and informed about their rights and access to government information, and (2) cultural and social dynamics keep people from demanding information to hold public institutions accountable. Because this logic model is supposed to be the basis of a communication strategy, the third phase includes articulating *specific communication objectives* that support the overall project objectives. Examples of such communication objectives include:

- > promote and increase citizens’ right and access to information
- > enact Freedom of Information Act, if applicable
- > increase citizens’ awareness of their right to information so they may hold the government accountable.

To realize those specific communication objectives, your agency needs to design *communication interventions*. In the case of our example, the interventions could be:

- > advocacy and a campaign for promoting the rights of civil society, the media, and the general public to know and to demand information
- > exposure and training of relevant nongovernmental organizations, media, and government officials with regard to laws and regulations concerning access to information
- > consultation to formulate a Freedom of Information Act, if one is not already in place
- > publication of government information as a way to decrease corruption.

It is very important not to stop a communication strategy at the intervention stage. To know whether the strategy has been effective, it is necessary to measure the outcomes of the intervention (step 5 of the model) and to discuss the impact of the strategy. Table 2 suggests methods for measuring outcomes.

Measures of outcomes might be (1) enactment of a Freedom of Information Act (if not in place before), (2) implementation of that act by government departments, and (3) citizens’ exercising their right to know. The changes that communication has produced should be measured through indicators such as the existence of the Freedom of Information Act itself, the number of government departments that have adopted the law, the number of government employees who know about the law, and the number of requests received from citizens and responded to by government staff. To find out whether citizens exercise their right to know, one can measure the citizenry’s understanding of the act, the number of requests made to government departments, and public attitudes about demanding government information.

The impact of the communication interventions usually cannot be measured; rather, they must be argued plausibly. In the case of anti-corruption efforts, the desired outcome would be “government institutions are transparent and the level of corruption is reduced.” It is necessary to argue (on the basis of the intervention outcomes) that communication indeed has contributed to achieving the desired changes expressed in the overall project objectives.

Suggested Actions

Engage with stakeholders:

- > Form an advisory group and exchange information with stakeholders.

Engage with the public:

- > Organize exhibitions in schools, colleges, and universities to highlight examples of corruption and its consequences.
- > Coordinate public forums and publish pamphlets, brochures, and newsletters for public distribution. Such methods of long-term aware-

Figure 1 Logic Model for Designing Communication Interventions

1 Objectives of Main Project	2 Communication Challenges	3 Communication Objectives to Support Main Project Objectives	4 Communication Intervention	5 Outcomes: What Change Has the Communication Produced?	6 Impact: Contribution of Communication to Overall Project's Desired Change(s)
	Project problems, needs	<p>What is required of stakeholders for intervention to succeed?</p> <p><i>Likely stakeholders:</i> Policy makers, lawmakers, media, civil society groups, communities, and so forth</p> <p><i>Likely spectrum of requirements:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > awareness/knowledge > attitude/opinion change > engagement/support > action (sustained?) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Listen and develop messages > Disseminate messages > Work on media advocacy > Build coalitions > Enlist policy makers and lawmakers > Pursue other actions needed for effectiveness 	<p>For example, change in:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> > media coverage > framing of the issue > priming of the public on the issue > positioning of the issue on the public agenda > stakeholder/community awareness of the issue > public opinion > stakeholder/community engagement, support, action > policy maker and lawmaker engagement, support, action <p><i>Indicators must measure the changes produced at this point.</i></p>	<p>Other inputs—for example:</p> <p>Advice + Money + Will of government</p>

Source: World Bank 2007, p. 4.

Note: CommGAP believes, with respect to box 3, that the will of the partner government is not sufficient. It is our assertion that wider participation is crucial for both success and sustainability of a reform effort.

a. Impact is argued, not measured.

b. Advice + Money + Will = Change.

Figure 2 Logic Model for Designing Communication Interventions for Anti-corruption Agencies

1 Objectives of Main Project	2 Communication Challenges	3 Communication Objectives to Support Main Project Objectives	4 Communication Intervention	5 Outcomes: What Change Has the Communication Produced?	6 Impact: Contribution of Communication to Overall Project's Desired Change(s)
Reduce corruption by promoting transparency and accountability of public institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Civil society and media are not educated enough and not informed about their right and access to government information > There are cultural and social dynamics of not demanding information to hold public institutions accountable 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Promote citizens' right and access to information > Enact Freedom of Information Act, if not already established > Increase citizens' awareness of their right to information so they may hold the government accountable > Increase citizens' access to information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Advocacy for promoting the right to know among civil society, media, and the general public > Exposure and training of relevant non-governmental organizations, media, and government officials regarding access to information > Consultation to formulate a Freedom of Information Act > Publication of government information as a way of decreasing corruption 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > A Freedom of Information Act has been enacted > Government departments are implementing the new law > Citizens are exercising their right to know 	Government institutions are transparent, and the level of corruption is reduced

Source: Authors' illustration.

ness raising and public education sensitize public opinion to the distinctions between legal and moral corruption, systemic and individual corruption, and petty and grand corruption; and enable citizens to understand the difference

between rumors of corruption and the reality of corruption.

- > Conduct an annual survey of the public's perception of corruption in your country, determining how citizens view and define corruption. Widely

publicize the survey findings and correct any public misunderstandings and misperceptions. This approach also provides an opportunity for anti-corruption agencies to build support for their programs by mobilizing public opinion.

- > Communicate directly to the public on your Web site. Interact with the public through alternative new media, such as blogs. Produce television dramas and documentaries to dramatize the effects of corruption. For example, show children who cannot go to school because their parents have no money to bribe officials.

Engage with the media and with civil society:

- > Regularly brief journalists and editors. Hold public events focusing on corruption as a means to build coalitions.
- > Design a communication strategy that effectively engages the media and civil society organizations in the work of the agency.

Box 2 Principles of Communication Campaigns

- > Know your audience.
- > Know your message.
- > Identify appropriate media channels through which to direct information.
- > Create clear and simple messages to produce effective persuasion.
- > Share common ideas, understandings, and experience with your audience to create coalitions.
- > Build trust and credibility with your audience.
- > Use multiple communication techniques and channels to present information in several ways.

- > Anticipate media inquiries about ongoing corruption cases that are being investigated. Provide accurate and timely information (such as facts/evidence/data) that counteracts unjust allega-

Table 2 Illustrative Indicators and Means of Measuring Outcomes

Outcome	Indicator	Means of Measurement
A Freedom of Information Act has been enacted	Existence of the act itself	Legislative records
Government departments are implementing the Freedom of Information Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Number of departments that have adopted the law > Number of government employees having knowledge about it > Number of requests from citizens received and responded to 	Stocktaking exercise Surveys (within the relevant survey population)
Citizens are exercising their right to know	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> > Level of citizens' understanding about the Freedom of Information Act > Number of requests made to government departments > Public attitude about demanding government information 	Surveys (within the relevant survey population) Stocktaking exercise Analysis of media content

Source: Authors' compilation.

- tions. Urge the media to get this information to the public.
- > Design anti-corruption messages that take into account the various criteria for newsworthiness.
 - > Seek redress from media councils who monitor the media when gross inaccuracies occur.
 - > Compile a national, annual anti-corruption report that outlines the activities of the agency. When launching the report, use the occasion to enhance professional relationships with the media and to educate the media on the nuances of corruption.
 - > Consider the United Nations' International Anti-Corruption Day (December 9) as a focal point to distribute information on corruption. Use this focus to award those media networks and journalists who use innovative approaches to fight corruption. Honor anti-corruption champions by noting their contributions to promote integrity in public service.

Conclusion

Communication is not the be-all and end-all of anti-corruption work, but it is an essential service for citizens and an obligation for anti-corruption agencies. Currently, anti-corruption agencies are failing this important obligation too frequently. Missed opportunities to communicate are missed opportunities to curb corruption. Those missed opportunities may spiral out of control and create such massive cynicism that the public's support evaporates. Simply put, the support of society

is critical for the success of any effort to reveal corruption, recover losses, and hold government to a higher standard of behavior.

Insufficient communication—or a total lack of it—makes work harder for anti-corruption agencies. A reputation built through hard work over a long stretch of time can be ruined by a 30-second media report of a scandal that catches the agency unaware and not equipped to respond. A single inaccurate news story can destroy a court case

Figure D



Source: Elaine Byrne, 2009.

carefully and laboriously prepared for prosecution and seriously may damage the agency pursuing the case.

By cooperating with the media and fully informing the public, anti-corruption agencies can correct the public perception of corruption, accurately represent their work and its success, educate citizens about the negative effects of corruption on their everyday lives, and mobilize both citizens and the media to help the agency achieve its good governance objectives. The media and public opinion are strong influencers of a country's cultural norms. Changing norms means changing behavior—including corrupt behavior.

Working with the media is not easy. Many factors that affect how the various media function make it difficult to communicate clearly and effectively,

either to them or through them. But there are practical tools and checklists that will help agencies build positive and successful relationships with the media and the public. The "Tools" section of this paper provides simple and effective guidance about practices and actions that can build good relations with media and civil society.

Successful communication, however, demands more than tools. Above all, it requires dedicated staff who take communication seriously. It takes trained communication specialists and senior officials who are committed to working with the media and with the public in pursuit of an agency's anti-corruption goals. Communication is not optional; rather, it is a primary obligation for anti-corruption agencies, and everyone involved in such work must take responsibility for its effective implementation.

Tools

Useful Checklists for Anti-corruption Agencies for Communicating with the Media and the Public

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Tool 1: Overcoming Real-World Challenges in the Struggle against Corruption

The lists of challenges and proposed activities in this tool are compressed, practical versions of the rapporteur's report from the 2008 learning event in Vienna. The themes correspond with the panel topics of the event. Challenges and activities were proposed by the panel presenters during the panel discussions and on the response cards that all participants were asked to complete after each panel. Some of the suggestions are practical and hands-on while others are broader and concern the political system. While no one person or agency can effect the systemic or institutional challenges on their own, anti-corruption agencies need to work with a wide range of stakeholders to bring about change. Successful governance reform efforts require effective coalitions.

Building Anti-corruption Networks and Coalitions within State Institutions

Challenges

- > Vested interests
- > Middle-manager opposition
- > Public apathy and cynicism
- > Lack of inter- and intragovernmental cooperation, and weak ties
- > Lack of clarity in legislation
- > Overlapping mandates
- > Turf battles among state institutions

Activities

- > Set up a unique anti-corruption agency comprising the three branches of government (executive, legislative, judiciary), and give it the power and autonomy to take action.
- > Adapt or tailor anti-corruption strategies to take changes over time into account.

- > Conduct political-economy analysis, mapping stakeholders to take stock of the opposition and support base.
- > Recruit reform champions in the legislature, making sure not to overlook partners in unusual or unexpected places.
- > Conduct an internal communication campaign within state institutions:
 - > Build trust in reform and trust among state institutions.
 - > Build integrity within state institutions.
 - > Harmonize activities of public institutions fighting corruption, and ensure that they share information with each other.
 - > Build a committee comprising relevant institutions at the national level.
 - > Build cooperative ties among state institutions.
 - > Create integrity committees within state institutions, and develop national anti-corruption policies.
- > Conduct research on overlaps in mandates and laws to ensure the reform process is transparent and not vulnerable to corruption.
- > Foster political will through media and civil society organization campaigns.
- > Anticipate potential opposition.
- > Create a media unit within the anti-corruption agency.
- > Train the media and nongovernmental organizations on anti-corruption methods and practices, and regularly inform them about your agency's work.
- > Educate media professionals on the challenges of fighting corruption.
- > Build coalitions with the media; package and present information to them in a user-friendly manner, while balancing the need for privacy and fairness.
- > Conduct a media campaign:

- > Build awareness and consensus regarding anti-corruption efforts.
- > Create awareness among the public about what corruption is all about and intervention means to fight it.
- > Communicate the messages that the fight against corruption is a development issue, and that everyone gains from it.
- > Expand the use of diverse types of media and communication channels.
- > Develop school programs on corruption to raise public awareness.
- > Take a long-term view. Coalitions are not built in a day, and they have to last a long time if they are to work efficiently against corruption.

Cultivating a Culture of Probity and Accountability within Public Authorities

Challenges

- > Weak internal accountability system
- > Lack of leadership commitment to ethical standards and to promoting ethical behavior as a priority within public institutions
- > Lack of a clear and enforceable code of ethics
- > Lack of staff awareness regarding the code of ethics
- > Lack of whistleblower protection
- > Low staff morale

Activities

- > Deliberately develop a whistleblower protection program, and enforce it to strengthen credibility:
 - > Provide an anonymous phone-in program.
 - > Devote time and resources to listening to whistleblowers.
 - > Clarify what constitutes wrongdoing to ensure no ambiguities exist.
 - > Encourage staff to talk about what the agency needs to know to (1) strengthen the organization's well-being, (2) reinforce codes of ethics, (3) reduce organizational waste and mismanagement, and (4) improve staff morale.
 - > Develop laws and the legal/operational

framework to protect whistleblowers as a means to fight corruption.

- > Establish a witness protection program.
- > Develop ways to make whistleblowing work in cultural contexts in which it is socially unacceptable.
- > Identify the motivation to engage in corruption and the motivation to blow the whistle on it.
- > Ensure that law enforcement agencies conform to high standards of integrity.
- > Make sure that a code of conduct is legally binding, and that it firmly is enforced by the judiciary.
- > Communicate clearly to staff the leadership's commitment to a code of ethics and to whistleblower protection:
 - > Adopt an enforceable code of ethics that espouses the core values and aspirations of the organization.
 - > Communicate code of ethics as part of core values/mission statements of the institution.
 - > At departmental functions, provide timely and regular information about internal accountability and the code of ethics.
 - > Communicate policy on corrupt behavior and consequences.
 - > Have zero tolerance for violations of ethics.
 - > Back up words with deeds.
 - > Deliver sure, swift, and fair punishment to those responsible for ethical improprieties.
 - > Make ethical behavior and conduct part of the requirements for employment in public service.
 - > Make the code of ethics and protection for whistleblowers part of the employee performance evaluation.
 - > Enable a third-party institution to audit and make adjustments to codes of conduct.
 - > Ensure that salaries for public officials are sufficient to motivate their adherence to the code of conduct.
- > Install an ethics officer in the organization.
- > Develop employee confidence in the system.
- > Develop staff pride in their jobs by providing reasonable salaries and developing societal respect for their positions.
- > Develop staff commitment and desire to abide by ethical standards in their work.

- > Conduct ethics training for staff:
 - > Make familiarity with the public service code of conduct part of new staff training.
 - > Make training in the code of conduct mandatory for all staff at every career level every few years.
- > Shift the focus of accountability from technical to ethical issues.
- > Create public awareness to demand accountability from public officials:
 - > Educate the public about the role of public officials (as defined in the United Nations Convention against Corruption, for example).
 - > Educate the public on the cost of corruption.
 - > Introduce the concept of ethics at home (that is, in churches, through parents, and so forth) and in the education sector.
- > Change cultural norms to stop the population from paying bribes to government officials.
- > Punish corrupt officials seriously.
- > Make asset declarations mandatory for public officials to introduce integrity in public life.
- > Keep a close watch on activities such as procurement and hiring; use competitive recruitment of staff, especially at higher levels.

Raising Issues on the Public Agenda

Challenges

- > Working with the media isn't always easy because:
 - > bad news sells
 - > journalistic stories may lack a human element and not link to real situations
 - > increased media coverage can create a misleading perception of corruption as a widespread phenomenon
 - > media may have to work under financial, political, and deadline pressures
 - > journalists may not always be able to uphold ethical principles
- > Corruption is a difficult issue to communicate because:
 - > it often is embedded in the culture, and is not exclusively the fault of individuals
 - > it is multifaceted, and therefore, difficult to package in a single message

- > it is a topic that government agencies have difficulty tackling for reasons of confidentiality

Activities

- > Initiate social movement and social marketing campaigns to boost public support for the work of anti-corruption agencies.
- > Target specific groups to lobby for change (such as legislators, members of the executive branch of government, and interest groups).
- > Develop a communication toolkit for politicians.
- > Build multistakeholder coalitions with sympathetic journalists, political leaders, and civil society:
 - > Cultivate positive and reciprocal relationships with key journalists.
 - > On December 9 (United Nations' International Anti-Corruption Day), hold public hearings on corruption.
- > Train journalists to report on corruption and build capacity for practitioners in all media.
- > Encourage sustainable investigative journalism and urge journalists to persevere in reporting about corruption.
- > Create incentives for the media to report on corruption (for example, give awards for corruption coverage that is highly innovative and of high quality).
- > Protect journalists by providing legal assistance if their reporting on corruption results in criminal charges.
- > Frame issues so that both journalists and their audience will be interested.
- > Choose and use frames that are appropriate for your message—for example, gain or loss frames, negative or positive frames, thematic or episodic frames:
 - > Frame the issue as new and important.
 - > Frame the issue in culturally resonant terms.
 - > Use real events as evidence of the issue.
 - > Dramatize the issue in symbolic and visual terms.
 - > Show the incentives/reasons for taking action on the issue (economic, health, moral, safety, and the like).

- > Show the human consequences of corruption by putting a “human face” to the issue and dramatizing its effects.
- > Highlight positive role models; use positive frames to communicate hope and the possibility of change.
- > Use negative frames to raise the salience of the issue in people’s minds and to evoke anger against corruption; however, pair negative information with a message of hope.
- > Show that corruption occurs not only at the grand level, but also at the petty, everyday level.
- > Transform data, facts, and statistics in ways that make them more easily understandable.
- > Provide and gather good practice examples for framing anti-corruption issues.
- > Communicate widely to audiences to build public pressure for change.
- > Use nontraditional media outlets.
- > In addition to news shows and documentaries, produce entertainment programs that show how corruption affects every-day life throughout society.
- > Advertise regularly in diverse media to encourage people to report corruption.
- > Broadcast short spots about ethical values.
- > Present information on corruption issues in simple language.
- > Publicly correct all inaccurate information in a timely manner.
- > When public funds are unaccounted for, give the public the most recent facts, figures, and survey results.
- > Create public forums that enable citizens to get involved in the fight against corruption.
- > Provide educational corruption-fighting materials for schools and universities.
- > Media must also be accountable and legitimate.
- > Media, government, and the public don’t trust each other:
 - > Mutual distrust can lead to hostile relationships between journalists and investigative agencies.
 - > The public may believe that media reports are biased and tend to characterize the government and related agencies as incompetent.
 - > Agencies may believe that the media have a hidden agenda when covering corruption, and so may not trust their motives.
- > The media sometimes blame the wrong people, and, when covering corruption, they may report more on the procedures and mistakes of the investigative body than on the corruption cases that have been solved.
- > If government institutions do not give clear information to the press, then the media likely will draw their own conclusions (which may not be in the government’s interest).
- > It frequently is difficult to mobilize the media and civil society when a corruption case should be made public.

Activities

- > Promote press freedom because there is an inverse correlation between press freedom and the level of corruption in a country.
- > Promote collective action by building a partnership among the media, the government, and civil society:
 - > Make it clear that fighting against corruption is a collective responsibility that requires everyone’s effort.
 - > Coordinate stakeholders and build their capacity.
 - > Coordinate media work with the efforts of civil society organizations.
- > Build coalitions with civil society organizations to raise public and institutional awareness.
- > Plan long-term public education campaigns to promote more transparency.
- > To ensure fair coverage, develop and maintain relationships with media before any large story breaks:

Supporting Media and Civil Society Campaigns to Remove Corrupt Leaders

Challenges

- > Who watches the watchdog?
 - > Media may be focused on sensations and bad news.

- > Do not be afraid of the media!
- > Provide as much nonclassified information to the media as possible to ensure accurate reporting.
- > Understand that the media act as a detecting and reporting mechanism, whereas an anti-corruption commission serves as an accountability mechanism.
- > Develop rules for sharing confidential information that may lead to the conviction of corrupt individuals.
- > Understand that the media's role is to expose corruption. When it is exposed, the relevant state institutions should take over and deal with the matter.
- > State institutions that fail to take action should be made to account for their inaction.
- > Establish or develop a media relations strategy to manage journalists' access to relevant information and their expectations of what your agency can provide to support their work.
- > Create a memorandum of understanding with press associations. An example of such a memorandum would be the agreement between the European Anti-Fraud Office and the International Federation of Journalists.²
- > Promote investigative journalism and train journalists accordingly:
 - > Educate journalists about corruption.
 - > Encourage investigative journalism by giving awards for best corruption coverage.
 - > Build capacity of the journalistic community.
 - > Promote professional ethics among journalists.
- > Engage the public/audience in mobilizing anti-corruption efforts.
- > Use alternative communication channels to disseminate information and generate public support.
- > Package information in a simple, clear, and accessible manner; target messages toward specific audiences you want to reach.
- > Give international examples, reminding the media (and general society, through the media) that corrupt leaders were removed from positions in neighboring countries.

Getting Citizens to Differentiate between Real Corruption and Rumors of Corruption

Challenges

- > What might be perceived as morally wrong is not always legally wrong.
- > A reputation of integrity takes years to build and seconds to lose.
- > Perception of corruption can be spawned by: disagreement over policy; lack of transparency; lack of ability, tools, and authority; and failure to deliver high-quality services.
- > Rumors of corruption may be politically motivated and used to discredit anti-corruption agencies, rather than to fight corruption.
- > If rumors about corruption abound, the media increasingly will report on corruption and create the perception that corruption is a widespread national problem.
- > If media information is incomplete, the public might not be able to differentiate between real corruption and rumors of corruption.
- > Anti-corruption agencies often are equated with individuals, so the focus is not on institutional achievements but on individuals and their potential shortcomings.
- > Media may be less interested in cooperating with anti-corruption agencies than in reporting sensationalist stories. The media "wants blood."
- > The presumption of innocence can be eroded by sensationalist reporting by the media.

Activities

- > Because the best defense is a good offense, build and maintain an ongoing relationship with the media and civil society organizations to defend the agency against damaging rumors of corruption:
 - > Build trust with the media through transparency, accountability, and openness.
 - > Involve media in the fight against corruption.
 - > Be proactive in cooperating with the media to optimize the likelihood that the coverage of corruption-related stories will be fair, accurate, and complete.

- > Form an advisory group and exchange information with civil society:
 - > Intensify the efforts of anti-corruption agencies to develop programs with nongovernmental organizations.
 - > Work with the media and civil society organizations to change the perception of corruption by communicating achievements in preventing corruption.
- > Create a national commission, including all anti-corruption agencies.
- > Encourage transparency and asset declarations.
- > Hold regular public and media briefings to share information about your work.
- > Anticipate and manage public discourse by developing and implementing a communication strategy based on clear and concise communication and transparent reporting of results:
 - > Keep messages simple and clear.
 - > Use the word “corruption” judiciously.
 - > Refrain from overstating the problem.
 - > Avoid promising unrealistic results.
- > Closely monitor the environment so you may react quickly if a crisis emerges:
 - > Be prepared to work with the media if a major event occurs, to avoid rumors that might jeopardize your work.
 - > Have your facts, evidence, and data in order so you may respond to unjust allegations and may inform the public accurately.
- > Inform and educate the public about the difference between real corruption and rumors, using media publications about corruption under investigation:
 - > Understand that information is both an obligation and a service.
 - > Raise public awareness about types of corruption, as well as their risks and effects.
 - > Publish and distribute books in schools and universities to raise student awareness of the risks of corruption and of its effects on economic and social development.
 - > Educate the public about anti-corruption agencies.
 - > Make people aware of the damage that rumors of corruption can do to the work of anti-corruption commissions.
 - > Heighten public awareness of the work of government agencies and of corruption laws to help citizens distinguish between real and perceived corruption.
- > Publish a clear and simple definition of corruption.
- > Provide accurate information on corruption cases that are being investigated or tried, so that the media may inform the public accurately.
- > Use new communication technologies and provide interactive platforms online:
 - > Develop an Internet-based interactive game that allows participants to test their knowledge of what is real corruption.
 - > Create a Web-based poll to determine the public’s perception of corruption.
 - > Through a Web site, request information about personal experiences with corruption; be sure to guarantee anonymity for people who submit information.
- > Communicate in a timely manner the findings from investigations and trials.
- > Use the media to explain or dispel inaccurate public perceptions by setting the record straight.
- > Conduct an annual survey of public perception of corruption, and provide monthly updates to the public:
 - > Include questions to reveal how respondents define “corruption.”
 - > Widely publicize survey findings and correct misperceptions that were found through the survey.
- > Engage in long-term awareness-raising and public education activities; conduct training courses and organize exhibitions around the country to highlight examples of corruption and its consequences.

Changing Norms about Everyday Corruption by Raising Awareness

Challenges

- > Lack of belief in oneself as able to do something about an issue (the efficacy challenge)
- > Lack of an environment enabling citizens to be open and willing to talk about an issue

- > Established and deeply entrenched opinions and norms
- > Lack of broad support for changing societal norms
- > Lack of political will and leadership
- > Lack of mass exposure
- > Lack of citizen participation in fighting corruption
- > Anti-corruption commissions' weak capacity to work with the media
- > Lack of long-term perspective when designing communication campaigns

Activities

- > Generate buy-in at all levels of government and society.
- > Conduct an analysis of society's values, levels of public awareness, and government structures.
- > Advocate for institutional reforms.
- > Create a clearinghouse of ideas, practices, campaigns, frames, and stories of successes in countering corruption; widely disseminate lessons learned to enable a sharing of knowledge across cities, countries, and continents.
- > Enforce anti-corruption laws impartially, regardless of the position or status of the parties involved.
- > Establish real partnerships with civil society.
- > Build civil society capacity to assist and engage in anti-corruption initiatives.
- > Empower citizens and encourage them to participate in fighting corruption.
- > Create an environment that encourages people to be open and willing to talk about an issue:
 - > Provide a means for citizens to report cases of corruption confidentially (such as Transparency International's Legal Advice Centers).
 - > Provide legal advice to victims of corruption.
- > Inspire civic action by helping citizens understand what they can do to fight corruption.
- > Develop bottom-up approaches to fighting corruption.
- > Build capacity for transparent use of public resources through education and access to information:
 - > As part of education, include events, training for public officials, distribution of handbooks, and distance teaching and coursework.
- > In schools and universities, educate the public about integrity and the need to fight corruption.
- > Raise awareness by distributing information, such as survey results, indexes, and studies.
- > Design awareness-raising programs.
 - > that have long-term perspectives.
 - > that are understood easily by the public.
 - > that link individual and societal corruption.
- > Explain perception-based corruption indexes to the public to avoid confusion and misunderstanding about what the ratings are intended to reveal.
- > Develop more objective indexes to measure corruption.
- > Build capacity among anti-corruption commissions to work with the media.
- > Work with the media to explain anti-corruption measures carefully.
- > Train and assist investigative journalists.
- > Use various types of media in public awareness-raising campaigns.
- > Link anti-corruption to human suffering to achieve a greater impact on audience.
- > Demonstrate to the public that corruption does not pay.
- > Share successful media strategies to educate, motivate, and inspire the public to participate in reporting and controlling the corruption problem.
- > Invest in institutions that deal with anti-corruption, ethics, and integrity.

Tackling Everyday Corruption

Challenges

- > Changing norms and behavior requires broad social support, political will, and leadership
- > In today's information-based society, the amount of available information can be overwhelming to the individual
- > In any effort to change established opinions or norms, it is difficult to move from increasing knowledge (awareness) to changing attitudes (opinions) to changing behavior (practices):

- > Attitude change does not lead automatically to behavior change, but when attitude change occurs, self-efficacy (belief that one can do something about an issue) and interpersonal communication (openness and willingness to talk about an issue) have to come into play to initiate behavior change.
- > One-size communication plans do not fit all contexts and situations
- > Corruption indexes will be counterproductive to the work of anti-corruption agencies if they distort the public's perception of corruption and create a stigma of corruption for your country
- > Perception-based indexes are very black-and-white indicators of progress—or the lack thereof—in combating corruption

Activities

- > Consider different styles of advocacy, depending on the local context: (1) soft diplomacy, (2) constructive engagement, (3) a coalition approach, or (4) commentary that falls somewhere between critical and very outspoken. Understanding the different levels of communication will help with planning and executing communication strategies.
- > Be transparent, and raise awareness about corruption.
- > Seek cooperation with international organizations working against corruption to get support in developing and strengthening media and communication strategies.
- > Provide public education through distance teaching and learning courses; by distributing handbooks, organizing events, and training public agents; and by educate schoolchildren and university students about integrity and corruption.
- > Create sustainable partnerships with civil society because citizen participation is key in tackling corruption:
 - > Employ bottom-up approaches to fight corruption.
 - > Involve the population in improving social control and building capacity for transparent use of public resources through education and improved access to information and social mobilization.
- > Inspire civic action by instructing citizens in what they can do to fight corruption. Empower them to realize that they can do something about corruption.
- > Develop awareness-raising programs to educate, motivate, and inspire the public to participate in reporting and controlling corruption problem.
- > Create a confidential system for citizens to report cases of corruption and provide legal advice to victims of corruption.
- > Build the capacity of anti-corruption commission officials to work with the media.
- > Avoid one-size-fits-all communication strategies. Instead, plan your communication with thought to special circumstances and contexts.
- > Plan long-term communication efforts because the war on corruption is a long-term war.
- > Carefully explain anti-corruption measures to the media and the public.
- > Explain corruption indexes to the public. Consider developing objective indexes to measure corruption.
- > Train journalists and support their investigations.
- > Make your advocacy and communication efforts contend for media and public attention by linking corruption to human suffering for greater impact and salience. Document successful efforts to make your messages memorable to intended audiences.
- > Use a wide range of media channels for anti-corruption campaigns, including different communication methods and new communication technologies.
- > Create simple and clear messages about corruption.
 - > Demonstrate to the public that corruption does not pay.
 - > Plan your messages with local situations and cultures in mind.

Communicating around Investigations

Challenges

- > The role of the media is ambiguous
- > Journalists may be most interested in big stories and less interested in the anti-corruption commission's work

- > Political support and both financial and human resources for communication are lacking
- > Confidentiality issues arise over what information can be revealed to the media
- > It may be unclear to what extent the media can be regulated without violating freedom of speech and of the press
- > Sometimes lawyers leak information and use the media to undermine the credibility of the anti-corruption agency

Activities

- > Consider communication to be an essential service for citizens.
- > Make transparency the key principle of your communication efforts.
- > Initiate and support cooperation and information sharing among states and their anti-corruption agencies.
- > Install and impose sanctions against lawyers who leak information.
- > Build coalitions with politicians to foster political will and support.
- > Include nongovernmental organizations in public awareness campaigns.
- > Provide institutional support to nongovernmental organizations that are fighting against corruption.
- > Raise awareness among children and youth in schools and universities.
- > Develop clearly defined communication strategies and messages.
- > Use existing communication networks, such as the Anti-Fraud Communications Network of the European Anti-Fraud Office, and create new ones.
- > Target corporate communication strategies at four levels: system, organization, practitioner, and audience.
- > Cooperate with journalists' associations, the academic world, and training institutions.
- > Understand how certain media are aligned with certain political figures.
- > Brief editors on anti-corruption work because editorial policy determines media content.
- > Identify journalists who will advance the anti-corruption cause, rather than hamper it:
 - > Build and use privileged relationships with sympathetic journalists.
 - > Train sympathetic journalists on the key concepts to enable them to report on complex issues more accurately and in simple words.
 - > Develop good working relationships with independent media to disseminate anti-corruption messages.
- > Always respond to media requests and document your replies.
- > Motivate journalists to cover corruption by establishing awards for best investigative reporting.
- > Be as transparent and fair as possible, and ask journalists to be equally transparent and fair.
- > Improve the flow of accurate information to the public.
- > Commission a regular national survey of public perceptions, awareness, attitudes, and evaluations of the anti-corruption agency's performance. Publicize survey findings widely to educate the public about the achievements of the anti-corruption agency and about the challenges it faces in fighting corruption.
- > Encourage the public to own the fight against corruption.
- > Through the media, establish a continuous two-way communication system between the anti-corruption commission and the public:
 - > Identify appropriate media channels.
 - > Sensitize the media to the role and mandate of the anti-corruption commission.
 - > Cultivate a better working relationship between the commission and the media.
 - > Identify and work with columnists.
- > Always be available for the media.
- > Implement communication campaigns using various tools, such as press releases, press conferences, newsletters, annual reports, and appearances on talk shows.
- > Prepare your own investigative stories and materials that can be used by journalists.
- > Link messages about corruption to human emotions:
 - > Make use of the full range of media technology to emphasize the emotional link.
 - > Include social-networking sites and blogs to reach citizens.

- > Package and deliver information differently, depending on the channel being used.
- > Frame corruption issues to reach your intended audience:
 - > Frame your anti-corruption messages in ways that resonate with the cultural values of the intended audience(s).
 - > Share success stories at national and regional levels.
 - > Follow up with journalists on developing stories.
 - > Immediately correct mistakes in your communication.


Tool 2: Planning a Communication Strategy for Anti-corruption Agencies

Perform a Political-Economy Analysis

Political-economy analysis (PEA) has a crucial part to play in enhancing the effectiveness of campaigns against corruption (figure 3). To bring about sustainable change, it is necessary to understand the environment in which corruption takes place. Only then is it possible to choose stakeholders to involve and to select the approaches with which to engage them. Politics and political economy—the subjects of PEA—influence whether and how reforms happen in any country with regard to any policy issue.

Rather than providing a broad overview, PEA should be *problem driven*. It should focus on specific issues and challenges to generate useful findings and implications. If done properly, PEA can provide insights about obstacles, options, and solutions that may be key to addressing corruption.

Corruption is a vast and complex problem. There are many aspects that could be addressed in a communication campaign, and there are many groups connected to corruption in some way. However, communication campaigns only work when they are *well targeted*. That means the agencies should not attempt



Source: Authors' illustration.

to solve the entire problem of corruption or to address all people in government, the private sector, and civil society. Rather, PEA helps direct a campaign to those issues and those stakeholders that matter most and that are most likely to influence reform.

PEA requires research and analysis at three levels: (1) identifying the problem, opportunity, or vulnerability to be addressed; (2) mapping the institutional and governance arrangements and weaknesses; and (3) identifying the political-economy drivers, both to recognize obstacles to progressive change and to understand where a “drive” for positive change could emerge. Figure 4 illustrates these three levels and their foci.

As outlined in figure 4, the first level of PEA requires defining the challenge that is to be addressed. Typical challenges are reforms that fail or are

implemented only partially, as well as reforms that are undertaken but have significant negative and unexpected results. Often, the challenge will emerge from ongoing policy dialogue or existing reports.

The second level aims at understanding institutional and governance arrangements and how these are related to poor outcomes. The aim is to explain why policies and/or institutional and governance arrangements are not sufficiently supportive of anti-corruption measures. The explanation will involve analyses of stakeholders and their interests and incentives, of how these interact with the institutional environment, and of how these have been shaped by political and economic dynamics over time.

The third level of PEA aims at discovering the underlying political-economy drivers. Discovering these is important to understand why the identi-

Figure 4 Three Levels of Political-Economy Analysis			
PEA	What vulnerabilities/challenges?	Evidence of poor outcomes to which PEA-identified weaknesses appear to contribute	For example, repeated failure to adopt sector reforms; poor sector outcomes; infrastructure identified as a constraint to growth, but not addressed effectively; continuous food insecurity; corruption that continues to undermine the business climate, even after anti-corruption law is enacted
	Institutional and governance arrangements and capacities	What are the associated institutional setup and governance arrangements?	Mapping of relevant branches of government, ministries, agencies, and state-owned enterprises and their interactions; existing laws and regulations; policy processes (formal rules and de facto practices). What mechanisms exist to ensure integrity and accountability and to limit corruption?
	Political-economy drivers	Why are things this way? Why are policies or institutional arrangements not being improved?	Analysis of stakeholders, incentives, rents/rent distribution, historical legacies, and prior experiences with reforms; social trends and forces (such as ethnic tensions); and how these trends and forces shape current stakeholder positions and actions

Source: World Bank 2009b.

Note: PEA = political-economy analysis.


fied problem has not been addressed successfully and to determine the relative likelihood of receiving stakeholder support for various change options. Understanding the institutional status quo in sufficient detail is crucial not only to conduct PEA, but also to be able to map a feasible reform path. PEA asks about underlying drivers, such as the relationships among stakeholders, the available rents and how they are distributed, interests, collective action dilemmas, and incentives.

PEA considers structures, institutions, and stakeholders as factors that influence a problem. Structural factors are beyond the direct control of (local) stakeholders, and many such factors change only slowly over time. Institutional variables are those related to “the rules of the game” (laws and regulations, and such informal rules as social obligations). Actors or stakeholders include individuals, organized groups, or groups with shared interests (such as political parties, the military, business associations, nongovernmental organizations, traditional associations, and traders in a particular region).

One of the crucial goals of PEA is an overview of the stakeholders involved with the issue. Stakehold-

ers can be mapped on two dimensions: interest in reform and influence on reform. A matrix with these two dimensions will show where the relevant groups stand and, most important, the positions to which they will have to be moved. Figure 5 presents such a stakeholder map. (The groups indicated in the map are examples only and will be different for different settings and issues.)

In figure 5, civil society, unions, and consumers have a high interest in fighting corruption because they often suffer the most from corrupt behavior. However, they have little political influence that could help them initiate reform or support anti-corruption agencies. Therefore, it should be the goal of a communication campaign to move those three groups into the top-left field of the matrix (high influence and high interest). Employer associations and politicians, who may have large influence on governance issues, may not be interested in changing the status quo because they benefit from corruption. In this case, a communication campaign should aim to move them into the high influence/high interest field of the matrix.



Source: Adapted from World Bank (2009a).

Clearly Identify Objectives

PEA has one specific goal: identifying feasible paths to reform. Because “feasible paths” are sensitive to the political-economy context, they also should be more compatible with a country’s culture. Finding feasible approaches to reform may include prioritizing the vulnerabilities and concerns that can be addressed with a reasonable chance of success; and proposing how governance arrangements can be improved in a way that not only is feasible but also is not likely to be subverted by political-economy drivers and would channel political-economy drivers more productively in achieving development and poverty reduction. These approaches include interventions, based on careful assessment, that might seek proactively to ease political-economy constraints—for example, by supporting coalitions for change, promoting a better informed public debate, and so on.

There can be more than one objective; however, more objectives make the strategy bigger, more complicated, and more expensive. The objective(s) of a communication campaign should be spelled out clearly. It is necessary to answer the following questions:

- > Which (feasible) outcomes are desired?
- > Which stakeholder groups are to be addressed, and for what purpose?
- > Do we want to raise awareness about an issue, to make people think differently about an issue (attitude change), or to encourage them to behave differently?
- > How will the challenges identified in the PEA be addressed?
- > What will be the time frame for the communication activities? (Usually, medium-term planning is required.)

The remaining steps in planning a communication strategy will only be outlined here. These steps are widely established phases in the communication community, and they result mostly from the two basic activities already discussed.

Identify the Stakeholders You Want to Address

- > Identify reform champions in relevant institutions who can help achieve your goal.
- > Build coalitions with the key stakeholders. (See “Coalition Building,” the third tool in this section.)
- > Identify and profile the audience you want to reach with a media campaign. Research the audience to discover their positions on the issue you want to address, their potential cultural sensitivities, their language habits, their social structures, and so forth.

Select Communication Channels

- > Select the channels through which you are able to reach the largest part of your target audience.
- > In areas where people don’t have televisions, (community) radio may be more efficient.
- > If your audience reads newspapers a lot, focus your media campaign on print media.
- > In remote areas, posters, flyers, or direct communication may be most efficient.

Design Messages

- > Message design depends on the audience and the communication channels available.
- > Articulate your messages clearly and consistently.
- > Phrase your messages simply, and back them up by a few “proof points” that include the most compelling data.
- > If appropriate, choose different messages for the different key audiences that you have defined.

Implement Strategy

- > Identify the tactics/activities with which to achieve each communication objective.
- > Among the possible tactical devices are press releases, press conferences, and replies to media requests.

Monitor Impact and Evaluate Strategy

- > Specify a method of evaluating the communication program. (One possible evaluation tool can be found in figure 3, "Logic Model for Designing Communication Interventions.")
- > Compare the outcomes and impact of your communication strategy with your objectives.
- > Possible evaluation tools include:
 - > Media analysis to determine if messages are coming across in the media.
 - > Web site statistics, if a project page is established.
 - > Monitoring of reduced negativity and/or growing support for your cause among citizens and civil society organizations.
 - > Counting of tactical devices provided (that is, the number of press releases, press conferences, media requests answered, and so forth).

Tool 3: Coalition Building

The following chart illustrates the relationships among the stages of coalition building, its communication dimensions, and a phased approach to building trust and leveraging diversity.

Key challenges	Coalition building stages	Description of each stage	Communication dimensions and recommended techniques
Building trust	Issue framing and specification	Overall objective of the political problem is articulated and broken down; policy options are defined in terms of a continuum of options	Gauging public opinion and consulting with policy experts to determine the national mood, public discourse, and policy options surrounding the reform initiative (use <i>public opinion research methods</i> and <i>key informant interviews</i>)
	Relationship/stakeholder mapping	Significant actors are identified, positions toward key and related issues are plotted	Listening to actors and key informants, including using and analyzing public opinion data to determine positions of general public as well as subgroups (use <i>public opinion research methods</i> , <i>network analysis</i> , and <i>key informant interviews</i>)
	Forming Core Coalition Membership	Core of a coalition is organized, early leaders and champions identified, and agenda takes shape	Listening to, lobbying, and persuasion of influential individuals and key targets, as well as deepening understanding of their positions and trade-offs (use <i>lobbying and persuasion techniques</i>)
Leveraging diversity	Demonstrating credibility	Coalition demonstrates it can act effectively and is worthy of support from stakeholders	Messages should focus on successes to date, even small ones, framed in terms of the interests and incentives of core membership and key stakeholders (use <i>issue framing</i> and <i>media relations techniques</i>)
	Purposeful expansion	Critical stage when a small organization builds a broader social and resource base while retaining coherence and effectiveness	Target of communication efforts should shift toward addressing the interests of broader relevant interest publics and policy networks (use <i>framing for collective action</i> and <i>networking approaches</i>)
	Sustainable transformation	Coalition has grown and becomes polycentric, with initiatives on many fronts, drawing strength from many sources	Communication efforts should broaden and include appeals to the general public, especially in terms of addressing social norms (use <i>framing for collective action</i> and <i>media relations techniques</i>)

Notes

1. By media we understand a wide range of means of communication, including more traditional media such as television, newspaper, and radio, but also new information and communication technologies (ICTs), such as the Internet, mobile phones, and social media. Research on media effects and the role of media for public opinion is mostly concerned with traditional media. However, because of the new access possibilities provided by new technologies, we explicitly include them as an important channel for communication. Some thoughts on the role of ICTs can be found on p. 32.
2. For a detailed discussion on the use of composite indexes, refer to Knack (2006).
3. Information on this agreement may be found at the following Web site: <http://www.ifj.org/en/articles/fostering-mutual-trust-between-journalists-and-anti-fraud-services-in-europe->.

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By working with the media and informing the public, anti-corruption agencies can influence public perception of corruption, accurately represent their work and their successes and achievements, educate citizens about the negative effects of corruption on their everyday lives, and mobilize both citizens and the media to help the agencies to achieve their objectives. To their immense cost, many agencies underestimate the role of the media and the negative effects of weak and inadequate communication on their own work. Missed opportunities to communicate are missed opportunities to curb corruption.

This publication is a “how-to guide” to help anti-corruption agencies understand how to control their public image, frame their work, and build public support. It shows why anti-corruption agencies need to take the media seriously. The publication introduces how the media communicate and what effects they have on the public. The second part of the publication provides tools and checklists for agencies that have proved helpful to practitioners in certain contexts or have been developed directly by anti-corruption agency officials. The first set of tools addresses real-world challenges that anti-corruption agencies face in their daily work and suggests activities designed to help meet those challenges. Second, a road map for designing a communication strategy outlines steps that can easily be followed to build a strong relationship with the media and the public. The third tool shows the phases of a coalition-building strategy, from building trust to achieving sustainable transformation.

The Communication for Governance & Accountability Program (CommGAP) seeks to promote good governance through the use of innovative communication approaches and techniques that strengthen the constitutive elements of the public sphere: engaged citizenries, vibrant civil societies, plural and independent media systems, and open government institutions. Communication links these elements, forming a framework for national dialogue through which informed public opinion is shaped about key issues of public concern. CommGAP posits that sound analysis and understanding of the structural and process aspects of communication and their interrelationships make critical contributions to governance reform.

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